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INTRODUCTION

The recent introduction of the Agricultural Act of 2014 dramatically changed the
payment mechanism for farm subsidy payments. The bill’s commodity program is
estimated to pay famers 32.5 billion dollars in subsidy payments (CBO, 2014). An
(un)stated goal of the US farm commodity program is to promote financial stability,
hence improving growth in the farm sector. Farm subsidy programs have become a topic
of much debate among policy makers and economists alike. The central issues are the
farmers’ ability to retain subsidy dollars; the degree non-retained subsidy dollars distort
output and factor markets; and the identification of factors contributing to the farmers’
non-retention of subsidy dollars.
Empirical research has found that farm subsidies are heavily chaptalized into land
rental rates (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009; Kirwan, 2009; Kirwan and Roberts, 2010). More
recently, theoretical and experimental research have demonstrated that disparities in
market power and negotiation behavior influence the ability of the farmer to retain
subsidy dollars (Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, 2011; Nagler et al., 2013). To date,
economists have yet to develop a widely accepted economic theory pertaining to farm
subsidy incidence. This is primarily due to the complexities of agriculture’s multistage
production system and various competitive relationships within and across production
stages.
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The method I use to analyze subsidy incidence is an innovative theoretical and
experimental approach that partially extends the market power work of Russo, Goodhue
and Sexton (2011). The contribution to the subsidy incidence literature is the
acknowledgement of a competitive environment in which i) factors of production in
agriculture are largely complementary, and ii) input suppliers in technically separate
markets are able to compete for the extraction of the subsidy dollars paid to the farmer.
The fundamental model is a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between
a price-taking buyer and two price setting input suppliers. The approach utilizes a game
theoretical model to identify the impacts of (i.) Competitive Relationships, (ii.) Input
Substitutability, and (iii.) Alternative Subsidy Policies.
i. Competitive Relationships of Input Suppliers and Competitive
Interdependencies: To identify the impact of market power the baseline
market power scenario depicts a complementary monopoly setting where
both input suppliers are the sole producer of their given products to the
perfectly competitive downstream buyer. The concept and a subsequent
theoretical model, in relation to subsidy incidence, acknowledges
upstream firms compete amidst one another (i.e. horizontal competition)
for extraction of the marginal subsidy dollar from the farmer. In addition,
the model extends to include the vertical competition between one
complementary factor producer (landowner) and the downstream buyer
(Farmer).
ii. Degree of Substitutability Between the Input Products: The literature,
with respect to agricultural subsidy incidence, to date, has ignored the
2

possibility of complementary factors of production. Non-substitutable
(complementary) inputs exhibit unique characteristics and generate
spillover effects (externality) within a sector. Specifically, in price
competition increasing in the price of one input negatively impacts profits
to the sellers of the complement inputs. This cross-price effect generates a
prisoner’s dilemma game for the two suppliers of the complementary
inputs. Accordingly, although to some degree counter-intuitive, both
monopolist input suppliers would benefit by coordinating and setting
prices below that of the Bertrand equilibriums (Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi,
2006).
iii. Alternative Subsidy Policies: In their history, Farm bills have introduced
several subsidy payment mechanisms that can be placed into one of two
general categories, decoupled or coupled. The payment mechanisms
influence agricultural markets in different ways. Thus, in regards to future
policy, we must understand to what extent these payments mechanisms
modify the production decisions’ of farmers and pricing decisions of input
suppliers. Accordingly, I consider a market in the presence of no subsidy
policy, a decoupled subsidy policy and a coupled subsidy policy.
Specifying a market structure that simultaneously permits the input suppliers to
display price setting, Bertrand, behavior differentiates this work from the current
literature. Additionally, the theory developed within this thesis is testable in a laboratory
setting. Testing the theory will provide validation of the extent that farmers benefit from
subsidy payments. In addition, experimental tests will indicate to what degree the input
3

suppliers are able to extract the subsidy dollar away from the farmer, not predicted from
the theory.
Consistent with past research the coupled subsidy policy results in a higher input
price for the coupled factor, hence subsidy incidence. As such, the farmer is unable to
retain the entire subsidy payment because the farmers increase in welfare is less than the
subsidy payment. However, several new outcomes only alluded to in past research are
observed. First, price in the non-affiliated input market (i.e. the factor market in which
the subsidy is not coupled) also rises. Though the subsidy incidence applies to all inputs,
the non-affiliated input markets capture the subsidy dollar to a lesser degree as technical
substitution of inputs rises. Second, aggregate subsidy incidence diminishes, as the input
products become closer substitutes. The combination of Bertrand competition between
the input suppliers and the degree of substitutability between technical inputs drives these
results.
The details of the manuscript are as follows. Provided first is a brief review of the
structural changes in the agricultural sector and an overview of past and current subsidy
policies. This is followed by my definition of the subsidy incidence and then a review of
the empirical, theoretical and experimental subsidy literature. Third, I develop the
theoretical model and discuss in detail various aspects of the model. Fourth, I provide
analytical solutions for a hypothetical farmer purchasing near perfect complementary
input products, such as land and seed. The analytical results are then directly tested in a
laboratory experiment. Finally, I provide results, conclusions, limitations, and
suggestions for further research.
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A BRIEF BACKGROUND: U.S. FARMING AND FARM POLICY

The underlying goals of the US farm commodity programs (i.e. promoting finical
stability through risk reduction) have not significantly changed over the last century.
However, farm structure (i.e. the market structure and therefore the competitive relations)
and government farm programs have undergone significant changes. This section
provides an overview of the structural changes in US farming and pertaining markets.
Concluding the section is an appraisal of the US farm policy programs and overview of
the most current state of farm policy.
Structural Changes of the US Farming Industry
Technological developments in agriculture have been particularly influential in
driving changes within the farm sector and pertaining factor markets. Technological
advances and specialization have greatly increased efficiency in both the production and
input markets (Kimle and Hayenga1993). Consequently, as farmers moved towards
buying more of their inputs (vs. producing), expenditures on inputs grew. Figure 1,
adapted from the farm production summary, addresses the change in spending on inputs
over the last decade. The two sectors of interest are seed expenditures and rent
expenditures which increased by roughly sixty and fifty percent respectively (ERS).

5

Figure 1

Percentage Change in US Farm Input Expenditures, 1997-2007

More recently, of the 200 billion dollars farmers spent producing crops is 2012,
they spent the largest share on land rent ($25 billion) and a record high on seed products
which totaled 17.8 billion dollars (USDA/NASS, 2013).
Competitive relation and Market Structure
In the model, forthcoming, I maintain the assumption of perfect knowledge as
Alston and James (2002). However, I relax the assumptions of a perfectly competitive
and static market, as technological developments in the most recent decades have been
significantly influential in altering the competitive structure of the farm sector, and
pertaining factor markets. I will first detail the market power and structural changes in
the biotechnical industry and will then discuss the land rental market.
The Agricultural Biotechnical Industry
First, technological advances in the biotechnical engineering industry (i.e. seed
manufacturing) have fueled rapid consolidation. For example, six of the largest
6

multiproduct agribusiness firms, acquired sixty-eight smaller seed companies (King,
2001).1 The consolidation leading to concentration enhances efficiency by altering
economies to scale. However, consolidation leads to concentration, which increases
market power. Specifically, consolidation increased the market power of a few firms as
they were able to obtain a larger share of the seed manufacturing market.
However, consolidation is not the only variation that has modified the seed sector.
Since the commercial introduction in 1996, the market demand for GM (genetically
modified) seeds has grown. From 1996 to 2008 the usage in acres of GM increased from
4.2 million to 309 million acres planted (Stiegert, Shi and Chavas, 2010). Farmers highly
value the GM seed’s efficiency gains through the increase in yields and reduction on
expenditures on complementary factors of production (i.e. pesticides, herbicides, etc.).
Thus, the GM seed industry experienced a rapid adoption rate for the positive attributes
bred into the seed. However, when considering the violations of perfect competition
within the industry’s market structure, the improved seed varieties do come at a cost for
farmers (Moschini, 2010).
Farmers and Policy-makers scrutinize bio-tech firms–who commercialized
patented crop seed– in regards to the firm’s monopoly power in the widely adopted
Roundup Ready soybean and corn market. For example, in the soybean industry,
Monsanto’s dominance is prevalent. Monsanto accounts for approximately 90% of the
production acres planted, directly and indirectly (Moschini, 2010). Moss (2009) indicates
Monsanto’s market power, granted through US Patents, adversely affect the market
through an increase in price and decrease in quality choices available to farmers. Fulton
1

Aventis (18), AstraZeneca (7), DuPont (5), Dow Chemical (10), Monsanto (22), and Novartis (60)
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and Giannakas (2001) suggest the adverse effects of these patents (i.e. market power)
have distributional impacts that are relevant for public policy consideration.
The Agricultural Land Market
The land market has seen an indirect impact from the technological advances that
have increased the economies of scale in production agricultural. As a result, farmers
turned to seeking employment in a non-farm sector, which effectively reduced the
number buyers in the production land market.
The impacts of the changes are easily seen on a local level, as there might only be
a few of perspective tenants due to the decrease in farmers (which has increased farm
size). The relevant region is defined as the area where famers can efficiently reach all
land. For instance, the famer would not want to rent land hundreds of miles from other
parcels of land and/or residence. The cost in this case is not just of a monetary value but
also represents an opportunity cost with respect to efficiency.2 Raup (2003) gives
evidence to the prior statement. His report states that many farmers reside within a tenmile radius from where they rent land and Kirwan and Roberts (2010) indicate a majority
of tenants live within a twenty-five mile radius of rented farm land (only thirteen percent
of tenants reside over one-hundred and fifty miles away). Additional support from
Kiwrin and Roberts (2010), indicate a movement away from the once perfectly
competitive environment of the land rental market.
There are typically few buyers and few sellers in the land-rental market for a
given geographical region. Thus, the market structure between the landowners and

2

This is one of the reasons I later specify the assumption of, decreasing returns to scale.
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famers is best described as a bilateral oligopoly. However, for simplicity it is assumed
the farmer (landowner) acts as monopsonist (monopolist) to model, properly, the
decreasing competition in this dominate buyer(dominate seller) market settings. I do
however, recognize that even in localized markets, input suppliers may not be
monopolist, and the farmer may not be a monopolist. In this setting the buyer and seller
are both setting price per unit of land based upon exogenous and endogenous factors. It
is important to note other factors such as personal relationships or lack thereof between
the tenant and proprietor may alter the ability for the landowner (farmer) to act as a pricesetting firm, however, this is left as an extension (i.e. bilateral negotiations).
In summary, because it is the case that the farmers are price takers for some inputs
(seed) and may negotiate over the price of others (land), I assume, the upstream input
providers are more akin to Bertrand competition.
US Farm Policy
The United States has supported the US farming industry with income supports
since the 1930’s, but over time polices have substantially evolved (Gardner, 1987).
Pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) has altered the US agricultural
commodity support system to be decoupled from production (Phillips et al, 2010). Due
to the potential distortionary effects, the US has sought to phase out coupled payment
mechanism subsidies and adopt a policy system which falls under a decoupled payment
mechanism, which is excluded from punishment by the WTO (Bhaskar and Beghin,
2009).
In regards to future policy, it is important to understand to what extent alternative
payment mechanisms modify the production decisions’ of farmers and input suppliers,
9

and untimely the realized profits (i.e. input and output choices). Zhu and Lansink (2010)
summarize four theoretical subsidy mechanisms, that induce changes in production: (i)
change in relative prices of inputs and outputs,; (ii) an income effect; (iii) the risk factor,
including perception and preferences; and (vi) through economies of scale (i.e. entry and
exit decisions in the farm production sector). The variation across the coupled and
decoupled programs will link farmers’ and input supplier behavior along with the market
outcomes. Thus, the variation will allow for inferences to benefits and effectiveness
specific payment mechanisms.
With the recent introduction Agricultural Act of 2014, the economic subsidy
incidence of various programs is a matter of high importance. Title I of the farm bill
relates to commodity support programs. The new farm bill, passed in February of 2014,
eliminates Direct Payments, Countercyclical Payments, and the Average Crop Revenue
Election (ACRE) program. Two new programs the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and
Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) replace these previous programs (USDA/ERS, 2014).
Furthermore, the Agricultural Act or 2014 allocated two times the about to insurance
programs as it does to the traditional commodity programs; As the focus of governmental
agricultural support shifts toward crop insurance (Just and Kropp, 2009). Accordingly, it
must be determined if removing the decoupled payment (fixed payments) system was in
the best interest of the agriculture sector or if the new coupled payments will be more
efficient. In other words, what payment mechanism distorts production the least while
improving the farmer’s welfare the greatest, thus which has a relative advantage.
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Decoupled Policies
The first decoupled program, production flexibility contracts, based upon
“historic acreage and yields” was introduced in the 1996 Farm Bill (Kropp and Peckham,
2012). As defined by Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) decoupled payments are “financed by
taxpayers and are not tied to current production, factor use or prices, for which eligibility
criteria are defined by a fixed historical base period,” and therefore cause little to no
market distortion . Such decoupled payments fall in the WTO’s ‘green box’ (no
distortions and not production limiting) and along with the ‘blue box’ (some distortions
but production limiting, i.e. quota) are excluded from discipline by the WTO (Bhaskar
and Beghin, 2009).
Though fixed subsidies are theoretically independent of the farmer’s output
decisions, the experimental literature suggests payments of this form may not be as
decoupled as assumed by theory due to human behavior (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009).
The literature indicate that decoupled payment mechanisms can enter a farmers
production function through risk (perception and/or preferences), and expectations
(Bhaskar and Beghin , 2009; O’Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010 Just and Kropp, 2009;
Guatella et al., 2013). However, to what degree these decoupled payments affect
commodity production is not clear; therefore, Weber and Key (2011) phrase subsidy
distribution as an open question.
Coupled Policies
When a direct linage exists between a farmer’s production process and (or)
market conditions, the farm program is categorized as coupled. Thus, coupled subsides
can benefit the farmer by reducing per unit cost (input specific subsidies) or increase per
11

unit profits (output specific subsidies). The literature suggests coupled programs as
having a greater distortionary effect on agriculture production, and pertaining upstream
and downstream agricultural markets. As the coupled subsidies are able to distort the
market by reallocating a farmers focus to a specific crop, or a mix of crops.
The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program was a product of the 2008
Farm Bill. This was a major change in US farm policy, as this program differed from the
coupled price triggered payments of the past. Payments with respect to the ACRE
program are triggered when at the state and farm level a revenue loss occurs (Dismukes,
Arriola, and Coble, 2010). ACRE payments where based on the difference between the
state target and actual state revenue. Thus, coupled to price and yields, on a state and
farm level (Kropp and Peckham 2012).3
The Agricultural Act of 2014 introduces two programs that follow a similar
payment mechanism to the ACRE program of the 2008 Farm Bill; however, the programs
have minor changes. The first program, Price Loss Coverage (PLC) is triggered by target
prices per commodity, and the second program, Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) is
based on a moving average of revenue risk. If elected, the PLC, makes payments when
triggered by prices below the outlined reference price to producers with base acres on a
commodity-by-commodity basis.4 The ARC Program gives producers two-coverage
options county-based or individual coverage. Payments are made to producers (with base

The assumption of a competitive output market of homogenous commodities—therefore a market price—
is made.
4
“The payment rate is the difference between the reference price and the annual national-average market
price (or marketing assistance loan rate, if higher). For each covered commodity enrolled on the farm, the
payment amount is the payment rate, times 85 percent of base acres of the commodity, times payment
yield. Producers may also receive payments on former cotton base acres (termed “generic base acres”) that
are planted to a covered commodity.” (USDA/ERS, 2014)
3
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acreage) on a commodity-by-commodity basis when county crop revenue (calculated by
actual average county yield & national commodity price) falls below eighty six percent of
the county benchmark revenue (based on a 5-year Olympic average).5 Alternatively,
producers can use individual farm revenue instead of county revenue. In this case,
payments triggered when individual aggregate crop revenues (i.e. all ARC program crops
on farm), are less than the ARC individual guarantee.6

“For each covered commodity enrolled on the farm, the county ARC payment amount is the difference
between the per-acre guarantee (as calculated above) and actual per-acre revenue (but no greater than 10
percent of the commodity’s benchmark revenue), times 85 percent of base acres of the commodity.”
(USDA/ERS, 2014)
6
“Payment is 86 percent of the farm’s individual benchmark guarantee, defined as the sum across all
covered commodities, weighted by plantings, of each commodity’s average revenue—the ARC guarantee
price (the 5-year Olympic average of national price or the reference price—whichever is higher for each
year) times the 5-year Olympic average individual yield. The payment amount is the individual farm
payment rate (the difference between the individual farm guarantee and actual individual farm revenue, but
no greater than 10 percent of the farm’s benchmark revenue) times 65 percent of base acres for all covered
commodities for the individual farm.” (USDA/ERS, 2014)
5
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LITERATURE: PREVIOUS ECONOMIC INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE
INCIDENCE OF US FARM POLICY

Theoretical work pertaining to the farm program payments date back to Floyd
(1965). Floyd’s neoclassical theory is grounded in the use of price elasticities. It is
hypothesized, that land being the most inelastic factor of production, will capitalize most
if not all of the marginal subsidy dollar, based upon the laws of supply and demand.
However, the prediction works if and only if all input markets are perfectly competitive.
A perfectly competitive market must be comprised of many price taking buyers and
sellers of homogenous products. It should be noted neither the land rental market nor
commodity seed market conform to the prior speciation (See Chapter II). Thus, Kirwan
(2009) views previous works that assume full incidence to land owners as flawed based
upon the realities of imperfect competition and social norms.
Currently, focus is moving towards relaxing the assumption of perfect
competition. Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008) spawned the discussion of market power
in the context of agricultural subsidies in regards to ethanol and the corn sector. Russo,
Goodhue and Sexton, (2011) also demonstrate that fallacies exist in the assumption of
perfect competition. Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, (2011) demonstrate by means of
simulations that the distribution of the marginal dollar intended for famers is highly
dependent upon the relational market power between the farmer’s upstream and
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downstream markets. Most recently, Nagler et al. (2013) demonstrate by means of
laboratory experiments that the retention of subsidy dollars (or lack thereof) is highly
dependent upon negotiation behavior and to some extent the competition between
hypothetical farmers and landowners.
The section is organized as follows. First, I discuss how I define and measure the
subsidy incidence. Then I will review the current state if the literature with in regards to
the theoretical and empirical methods. I will then move on to an appraisal of the
experimental methods.
Defining and Measuring Subsidy Incidence
Economic incidence, as referred by Kirwan (2007), is a more interesting matter
[then statutory incidence] as economic incidence is the examination and analysis of
behavioral changes, rather than legal rights. In the context of farm subsidies, the
economic incidence, examines to what degree the intended beneficiary (the farmer)
captures the marginal subsidy dollar or to what extent the upstream (and downstream,
although that is beyond the scope of this study) firms in the factor market extract the
subsidy dollar. Otherwise stated, for every dollar the farmer receives from a subsidy
payment, how much are the input suppliers simultaneously able to extract through higher
prices when they exert market power. The distribution and extent to which farmers, the
intended beneficiaries, actually benefit is critical to understanding the effectiveness of
subsidy policy. First, as one of Harberger’s (1971) three postulates, the benefits and cost
for the participants within this market will be added without regard to whom they occur,
across policy treatments for the ‘sector’ welfare (Efficiency) analysis (Alston and James,
2002). Secondly, the cost and benefits for participants within the market with regard to
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whom they occur will be addressed to analyze the ‘sector’ equality. In other words, I will
evaluate the welfare implications and production distortion of various payments
mechanisms to determine which has a relative advantage.
Review Theoretical and Empirical Literature
The subsidy incidence with respect to only one factor of production, land markets,
is overwhelmingly prevalent in both the theoretical and empirical work (Roberts and
Kirwan, 2003; Hendricks, Janzen, and Dhuyvetter, 2013; Kirwan, 2009; Latruffe, and
Mouël, 2009; Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, 2008. Kirwan (2007) points out the basis of
these simplistic models, which only use the rental market, is due to the fact that farmland
rental markets is unique. Where Kirwan defines unique as “provide an ideal setting to
measure the economic incidence of agricultural subsidies” due to the per period price
which allows the expectation about future periods to be dismissed. However, many
agriculture inputs display a high degree of complementarity and at the extreme is land
and seed. The literature in the current state has not examined the effect of this
relationship in regards to impacts on the distribution of the subsidy dollar. Therefore, the
findings of Singh and Vives (1984) become a fundamental part of my modeling approach
which specifies the dominant strategy for symmetric quality duopoly is to choose price
when complement input goods are considered.
The early literature is built upon the net present value model (NPV) or variations,
to estimate the subsidy incidence on land values, resulting in estimates being close to
perfect incidence, i.e. the subsidy is being capitalized fully by the land value or rent
(Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992; Just and Miranowski, 1993; Weersink et al, 1999;
Schmitz, Just, and Moss 2003). Even as recent as 2011 the NPV model was used to
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conclude that subsidies are capitalized into land values, thus land owners are the main
beneficiaries of the farm program (Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné, 2011).
However, the fundamental empirical model (NPV model) results in many unanswered
questions. Hendricks, Janzen, and Dhuyvetter. (2012) suggests challenges to this method
of estimating the incidence of land values based on the data to estimate all parameters in
the NPV model is not available. Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné (2003) also
conclude that not all relevant data for the NPV is available. In addition, the way in which
the subsidy enters into objective function in the NPV model raises question about the
models construct validity (i.e. ability to identify, accurately or consistently, the subsidy
incidence), and consequently ability to establish a causal relationship (Kirwan, 2007)
Kirwan ( 2007, 2009) has contradicted (most) of the early literature with findings
suggesting that landowners only capture twenty to twenty- five percent of the marginal
subsidy dollar. As the literature currently stands, it is clear that a large part of the
marginal subsidy dollar has yet to be accounted for. This raises an important question, if
the landowner captures only twenty to twenty-five cents of every additional dollar, whom
is able to capture the remaining eighty to seventy-five cents of the subsidy dollar?
Kirwan (2007) suggests that when input prices rise considerably with respect to a
subsidy, input suppliers are able to extract the benefits. Although market power is not
detailed or explicitly accounted for, the suggested rent-seeking activity can be done if and
only if a firm has some kinds of power in the market (Kirwan, 2007).
Kirwan’s collaboration with Roberts (2010) utilize the rental rate model and finds
that subsidies are not “fully capitated into land values” with evidence close the Kirwan’s
(2007) prior work. The suggested reason is tenants have bargaining power due to social
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norms—family ties or relationship between tenant (Farmer) and Landowner (Kirwan and
Roberts, 2010). Hendricks, Janzen, and Dhuyvetter (2012), adds another element and
suggests the period of the contract could alter the rate of incidence.
More recently, some focus has been moving towards relaxing the assumption of
perfect competition. Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008) laid the foundation of market
power in the context of ethanol subsidies. The analytical model raised the question of
market power — and states presence will alter the subsidy distribution. Specifically, the
research is focused on “whether analyses that rely upon this assumption [competitive
environment] are able to capture the true distribution of benefits from ethanol subsidies
on presence [of downstream and/or upstream market power]”. However, an oversight
was the lack of generality of the model as the Leontief function is rather restrictive thus
results in a loss of explanatory power. In all though, their results suggest larger
distributional impact when market power is considered. Furthermore, market power’s
distributional impact on subsidy incidence is larger than price and quantity impacts alone.
Thus, the welfare impactions with respect to equity (i.e. benefiting those intended) maybe
lower than once expected. As Saitone and her co-authors question the validity of
previous works that assume a perfectly competitive market in the downstream, I question
the validity in the upstream market. Therefore, I will extend this concept to the upstream
market and account for the horizontal competition rather than vertical competition in the
above manuscript.
Russo, Goodhue and Sexton (2011) also conclude that market power can
redistribute the marginal dollar of the farm policy. Thus, Russo, Goodhue and Sexton
(2011) also demonstrate that fallacies exist in the commonly made assumption of perfect
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competition. Fallacies exist because in the presence of market power, the policy
outcomes are suggested to differ greatly from the intended results (Russo, Goodhue and
Sexton, 2011). However, the three stage production model considered one upstream and
one downstream market, and ignored the horizontal competition that exist in the upstream
market.
Neither empirical nor theoretical approaches thus far have been able to form
robust estimates for the subsidy incidence. Consequently, the literature has no clear or
well defined measure of the subsidy incidence, as the marginal subsidy dollar low (high)
bound for the incidence is twenty-one cents (one dollar) (Kirwan, 2009 and Floyd, 1965).
However, I can make one clear conclusion; analytical, econometrics, empirical, and
theoretical methods, leave many questions unanswered. The underlying discrepancies of
the estimates, as appraised by Myers, Sexton and Tomek (2010) indicate that the perfect
competition assumption may be at cause, as the assumption will lead to misleading
results when an oligopoly, oligopsony or both characterize the true institution.
Experimental Literature
Since, economic incidence is concerned with behavior and factors that alter
behavior the insights provided, from the empirical and theoretical approaches that
comprise the majority of the subsidy incidence literature are not the most intuitive
approach. Experimental economics is a way to explore human behavior in an economic
decision setting by allowing the researcher to tightly control the environment in which
the participants make decisions (Riedl, 2009). Thus, experimental economics is a more
appropriate to obtain intuition to a policy matter, than its counterpart empirical analysis,
due to the multistage production problem that is concerned with changes in behavior.
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The laboratory setting will allow isolation of theory’s explanatory power and therefore
allow causation inferences to be made which is vital in solving “complex production and
allocation problems” (Davis and Holt, 1993).
The growing literature applying experimental economics to the economic
incidence of farm subsidies provide a means to measure the economic incidence form the
theory model in a laboratory setting. Bastian et al (2008) conducted an ex ante evaluation
of agricultural policy using an experimental approach. The findings suggest when
evaluating a current policy the available data is not robust enough for an accurate
indication of the incidence. Accordingly, I utilize an experimental approach to address
the problem of the economic farm subsidy incidence. Philips et al (2010) find that a
decoupled policy mechanism more efficiently reaches the intended policy objective,
mainly because the mechanism induces fewer market-altering distortions. The payments
system for this experiment are out of date with current policy, as the decoupled scheme of
fixed lump sum payments were eliminated in the Agricultural Act of 2014. However, a
fixed payment mechanism does allow for insightful comparisons across alternative policy
treatments.
The most recent experimental work on subsidy incidence focuses on the transfer
efficiency and market distortions when payments to farmers are transferred to the input
market. The results roughly 50-50 split contradicts the more recent empirical estimates,
however, Nagler et al. (2013) observe subsidy incidence in in the presence of
negotiations, which may be the reason for the difference. However, this is a more
efficient way to conduct policy analysis, as ex ante allows for the decomposition and
analysis of policies before implementation.
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I will appeal to the strengths of the current literature while accounting for the
shortfalls within the theoretical model, presented in Chapter 4, Theoretical Model
Development
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THEORETICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT

I develop a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game, where two upstream
firms are Bertrand competitors selling complementary goods (i.e. factors of production).
Where, a hypothetical seed manufacture competes with a landowner in setting prices. I
assume that price is the focal point of the quantity input decisions of the farmer. I
recognize that even in localized markets, input suppliers may not be monopolists, and the
farmer may not be monopsonist. However, the model does provide important qualitative
insights into subsidy incidence and testable hypotheses for laboratory experiments. The
model can be easily extended to include bilateral negotiations, by allowing negotiation,
the typical trading institution for land rent. This would allow the farmer to gain some
measure of countervailing market power.7
i.

I will continue with modeling the corner solutions for a bilateral
monopoly, which occurs when a monopolist faces a monopsonist. The
three possible outcomes of the market in Bertrand competition are: The
buyer (monopsony) or seller (monopoly) can act as a dominate player and
force the other to accept the price decision.

7

See Chapter VII
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ii.

The participants can cooperate, thus achieving a joint solution.

iii.

The market could collapse in which case the landowner would not sell
land and the farmer would purchase no land, in other words stage 2 would
not occur.

Accordingly, obtaining the solutions for a dominate seller (landowner) and a dominate
buyer (farmer) will provide useful baselines in regards to analyzing the market outcomes,
with respect to price boundaries.
The theoretical model presents six Nash predictions (i.e. subgame perfect Nash
equilibriums). More specifically, this thesis investigates two market power scenarios for
three alternative subsidy policies. The market power scenarios investigated are
i. Dominate Seller (DS): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer and Landowner
vs. a Competitive Farmer
ii. Dominate Buyer (DB): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer and Competitive
Landowner vs. a Monopsonist Farmer
The model permits the input suppliers (and buyer) to simultaneously exert market power
and thus compete for the subsidy dollar in the following subsidy policies
i. No Subsidy (NS)
ii. Fixed Subsidy (FS): Independent of farmer production and/or input
supplier pricing decisions,
iii. Coupled Subsidy (CS): Tied to the amount Land the farmer choices to put
into production given the prices of inputs.
The approach allows for the corner solutions of the bilateral monopoly to be
analyzed in regards to prices, sector welfare and surplus distributions. Finally, the
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theoretical predictions will be tested in three experimental treatments, by means of
laboratory experiments.
Farmer Technology
To begin I stipulate the production technology of the farmer, as it is pivotal in the
derivation of the differentiated factor demands faced by the input suppliers. As discussed
by Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008), whom employ a Leontief production function, a
relatively inelastic demand exists between land and seed. However, the functional form
fails to provide negatively sloped differentiated factor demands— a requirement for input
suppliers to exert market power. Therefore, the choice of production technology (i.e. the
functional form) for agricultural inputs must be flexible enough while still allowing for
near fixed proportion technology.
Initially considered was the fully flexible and the well-known CES production
function. However, I am able to demonstrate there exist limitations of this functional
form in the presence of Bertrand market power. Primarily, regardless of product
differentiation, Bertrand competition results in input suppliers employing marginal cost
pricing (See Appendix A). Alternatively, I utilize a quadratic production technology that
follows from the well-known quadratic utility function derived by Bowley, (1924).
The Bowley model has been used extensively in modeling differentiated product
in Bertrand and Cournot competition (e.g. Dixit, 1979: Singh and Vives, 1984; Häckner
2000; Symeonidis, 2002). By rephrasing the parameters of the Bowley model, the
farmer’s (F) technology can be written as
1
Y  a( L  S )  b( L2  2 LS  S 2 )  m
,
2
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(1)

where land (L) and seed (S) are the two representative inputs used by the famer to
produce output of commodity (Y). The intercept for the aggregate demand of inputs, a,
and the slope of the aggregate demand, b, are positive parameters; σ represents the degree
of substitutability between the two inputs, , where a value of -1 denotes perfect technical
complements, 0 technical independence, and 1 perfect technical substitutes. Finally, m
represents all other inputs with price normalized to 1.
Though the modeling approach in applicable to all degrees of technical input
substitutability, we focus only on technical complements as most farm inputs are
complementary in nature such as seed, land, fertilizer, and equipment. Because only
complement input goods are considered, I rely on the findings of Singh and Vives (1984)
and others that the dominant strategy for symmetric quality duopoly is to choose price
when products are complements.
Dominate Seller (DS): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer and Landowner and the
Competitive Farmer
The industry structure and competitive relationship assumptions are as follows.
To begin, the representative farmer acts as a profit maximizer.8 I begin the solution
process in stage two from which the input suppliers begin their backward induction. In
stage two, the general form of the farmer’s (F) objective function is

Max  F  PY ( L, S )  C ( L, S )

,

(2)

The profit maximization assumption implies that the farmer is risk neutral. Thus, the farmer whom faces
risk in the context of this model through the market price of commodity Y, chooses only to be concerned
with profit and therefore maximizes the expected value of his profit with respect to input choices.

8
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where I assume the farmer takes output price P and input costs C as given and Y(L,S) is
the production technology of the farmer. In stage two, the buyer (farmer) chooses
quantity subject to the prices set by the input suppliers. In stage one, the suppliers
simultaneously and independently choose a price while accounting for horizontal
competition and by backwards induction the farmer’s production technology and the
complementarity the inputs. The diagram depicted in Figure 2 illustrates the industry
structure and competitive relationships between the players used to develop the
theoretical model.

Figure 2

The Relation and Market Interactions of the Farmer, Landowner and Seed
Manufacture

The section begins with derivation of the baseline scenario, a market with no
subsidy policy. The no subsidy case is followed by a fixed lump sum payment
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mechanism then finally the coupled subsidy mechanism. After all theoretical solutions
are derived the surplus distributions of all three policy cases will be discussed
No Subsidy Policy (NS)
I first derive the results when there is no subsidy policy in place and this
represents the baseline of comparison to other subsidy policies. Substituting the
technology equation (1) into the farmer’s general profit equation results in the famer’s
explicit objective function
1


Max  FNS  P  a( L  S )  b( L2  2 LS  S 2 )   wL L  wS S ,
L,S
2



(3)

where wL and wS represent the price of land (rental rate) and seed, respectively. Taking
the first order conditions of profit equation (3) results in

 FNS
 P  a  b( L   S )   wL  0 ,
L

(4)

 FNS
 P  a  b(S   L)   wS  0
.
S

(5)

and

Taking the second order conditions of profit equation (3) results in
 2 FNS  2 FNS  2 FNS  2 FNS

 (bP)2  (bP )2  0  (b, P) > 0 and -1    0 (6)
2
2
L
S
LS S L
.

Thus, confirming that the (Bowley type) technology allows for satisfaction of both the
necessary and sufficient conditions for profit maximization.
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Simultaneous solution of the first order conditions results in the following factor
demands for land and seed
 NS aP(  1)   wS  wL
> 0  (a, b, P) > 0 and -1<  0
 LF 
bP( 2  1)

.

aP
(


1)

w


w
L
S
 S NS 
> 0  (a, b, P) > 0 and -1<  0
F
2

bP
(

1)



(7)

Because the farmer is a price taker in the input market, the factor demands constitute the
farmer’s second stage best response functions to input prices
To address the appropriateness of assuming a quadratic technology I will describe
attributes of the Bowley type factor demands. I use the comparative statics with regard to
the factor demands of land and seed. First, I look at the factor demands with respect to a
change in output price and find

LNS
S NS
a(  1)
F
 F 
> 0  (a, b, P)  0 and -1    0 .
P
P
bP( 2  1)

(8)

Thus, increasing output price of a program commodity increases the quantity of land and
seed the farmer is willing to purchase. Taking the own input price comparative static
results in

LNS
S NS
1
F
 F 
 0  (b, P)  0 and -1    0
wL
wL bP( 2  1)

(9)

Therefore, the factor demands are downward sloping which facilitates input provider
market power. Taking the cross price comparative static I find that

LNS
S NS

F
 F 
< 0  (a, b, P) > 0 and -1    0
wS
wL bP( 2  1)
.
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(10)

Therefore, because of the negative cross price relationship, attempts of input rivals to
increase price reduces both firms output. In all, the Bowley technology results in
appropriate attributes of factor demand.
With the famer’s second stage best responses (factor demands), I turn my
attention to the competition between the input suppliers in stage one. The seed firm and
landowner simultaneously set price while accounting for the farmer’s substitutability of
their respective products. Without loss of generality, I let the representative input
suppliers have symmetric constant marginal cost equal to zero, no fixed cost, and no
capacity constraints (Dixit, 1979). By backward induction, the landowner (L) and seed
firm’s (S) objective functions are
 Max  LNS  wL  LNS
F 
 wL

NS
NS
 Max  S  wS  S F 
 wS
.

(11)

After substitution of the respective factor demand equations (7), the first order
conditions of the supplier’s profit equations (11) are

 LNS aP(1   )   wS  2wL

0 ,
wL
bP( 2  1)

(12)

 SNS aP(1   )  wL  2wS

 0.
wS
bP( 2  1)

(13)

and

Solving the first order conditions with respect to own price, results in the
landowner’s and seed firm’s Bertrand reaction functions
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 wS
 NS 1
 wL  2 (aP(1   )  wS ) > 0  (wS , P) > 0 and a  P(  1)


.
 wNS  1 (aP(1   )  w  ) > 0  (w , P) > 0 and a   wS
S
L
S

2
P(  1)


(14)

It is easily shown (Figure 3) that the reaction functions are downward sloping for
technical complements.

Figure 3

The Bertrand Reaction Functions of the Seed Manufacture and Landowner
in Terms of wl ( wS )

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and σ=-0.99
Simultaneous solution of reaction functions (14) result in the Bertrand subgame
perfect no-subsidy equilibrium (NSE) prices for land (rental rate) and seed,

wLNSE = wSNSE 

aP(  1)
> 0  (a, P) > 0 and -1    0
.
 2
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(15)

Therefore, suppliers optimally exert market power and choose prices above their

dwLNSE dwSNSE
aP


 0 for
respective marginal costs. It is interesting to note that
d
d
(  2) 2
all conventional restrictions of parameter values. Therefore, the degree of market power
is a function of substitutability. As can be seen in figure 4, as inputs become closer
technical complements, equilibrium prices reach their highest levels above marginal
costs.

Figure 4

No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Input Prices

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1
Given the equilibrium prices from stage one; I now return to stage two, the
farmer’s equilibrium choices of input quantities and resulting profit. By substitution of
the equilibrium input price equations (15) into factor demand equations (7) results in the
equilibrium quantities of land and seed,
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LNSE
 S FNSE 
F

a
> 0  (a, b) > 0 and -1<  0 .
b(  2)(  1)

(16)

It is important to note that the relationship between input substitutability and
optimal inputs purchased is strictly convex as

6a 1     1 
 2 S FNSE  2 LNSE
F



 0  (a, b) > 0 and -1<  0 .
3
3
 2
 2
b   2    1

(17)

Figure 5 demonstrates this convex relationship over the range of input complementarity.

Figure 5

No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Quantities

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1
Therefore, as technical complementarity increases, the optimal input quantities
increase. Furthermore, by extension it is necessary that the commodity output increases
per the farmer’s technology (1). Interestingly, by comparing Figures 4 and 5, it is readily
apparent that increasing technical complementarity increases both market power and
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production. The output result is not intuitively obvious as increasing market power
typically results in lower outputs, and hence reduced surplus to the buyer.
Next, I will examine the impacts of technical input complementarity on the
profitability of farmer, and then input suppliers. Starting with the Farmer, by substitution
of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (15) and quantities (16)
into the farmer’s profit function (3) I find

 FNSE 

a2 P
> 0  (a, b, P) > 0 and -1    0 .
b(  2)2 (  1)

(18)

The farmer’s equilibrium profit is strictly convex as

6a 2 P  2 2  1
d 2 FNSE

 0  (a, b, P)  0 and  1    0 .
4
3
d 2
b   2    1

(19)

Next, looking at upstream input suppliers, by substitution of the corresponding
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (15) and quantities (16) into the
supplier’s profit functions (11) I find

 SNSE   LNSE 

a 2 P(1   )
 0  (a, b, P)  0 and  1    0 .
b(  2)2 (  1)

It is the case that supplier profits are strictly decreasing in the substitutability of their
input as
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(20)

2
2
d LNSE d SNSE 2a P     1


 0  (a, b, P)  0 and  1    0 .
3
2
d
d
b   2  1   

9

(21)

As can be seen in figure 6, for various degrees of input complementarity, the
highest profit for all three firms is when input products are nearly perfect complements.

Figure 6

No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Profits of Farmer and Input Suppliers

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1
By comparing figures 4 and 6, increasing market power as indicated by higher
input prices results in higher, not lower, buyer profits. The reason for this apparently
counter intuitive result is due to the expansionary effects in input/output depicted in
figure 5 as input complementarity increases. Therefore, buyer surplus increases when
inputs are close complements. In all, increasing the complementarity between technical
inputs i) increases market power and ii) unilaterally increases sector surplus. Again, the
Following classical results, profit for Bertrand competitors approach zero as substitutability approaches 1
(i.e. perfect complements)

9
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later results are largely due to the expansionary effects of input complementarity.
Therefore, an increase in market power of input suppliers does not necessarily harm
sector welfare.
Fixed Subsidy Policy (FS)
The first subsidy analyzed is a decoupled or fixed subsidy. As defined by
Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) decoupled payments are “not tied to current production,
and/or factor use or prices,” therefore causing little market distortion. As O’Donoghue
and Whitaker (2010) we focus on whether or not the direct payments induce a change in
the farm’s production decision. Accordingly, define the objective function of the farmer
eligible for a generic fixed subsidy G
1


Max  FFS  P  a( L  S )  b( L2  2 LS  S 2 )   G  wL L  wS S .
L,S
2



(22)

Given the assumed separable influence of G, subsequent subgame perfect
solutions of the dynamic game outlined in the previous section will equal those observed
under the no-subsidy policy (Just and Kropp, 2009; Guastella et al, 2013; Nagler et al,
2013). By substitution of the subgame perfect input prices (15) and quantities (16) into
the farmer’s profit (22), the farmer’s new equilibrium profit is



FSE
F

a2 P

+G > 0  (a, b, P, G) > 0 and -1    0 .
b(  2)2 (  1)

(23)

The direct effect of decoupled payments cannot be rebutted, as the fixed subsidy
improves the farmer’s sector surplus and does not distort input market prices and
quantities under the assumption that G is a separable influence on the farmer’s
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investment decision. In other words, theoretically it is clear separable payments raise the
profit and welfare of farmers’. However, decoupled payments may have indirect effects
on agricultural production and markets.
Coupled Subsidy Policy (CS)
Coupled subsidies enter the farmer’s objective function as essentially an input
price support of land. The subsidy is ‘coupled’ in the sense that the payment mechanism
effectively reduces the price (rental rate) per acre of land, thus decreasing the marginal
factor cost of land to the farmer. The payment mechanism is a proxy for base acreage
payments determined by historic acreage and yield (Kropp and Peckham, 2012). The
size of the base acreage payment is associated with the amount of land the farmer places
under production.10 In addition, whoever farms the land receives the payment. The
model that follows does not rely on assumptions of whether the farmer purchases land or
pays cash rent.
As with the no-subsidy policy, we begin our analysis at stage two of the game.
The farmer’s objective function is now
1


Max  FCS  P  a( L  S )  b( L2  2 LS  S 2 )   (wL   ) L  wS S ,
L,S
2



(24)

where  is the subsidy payment per acre of land.11

Following from Just and Kropp (2009) I assume, for simplicity in modeling, that all acres provided by
landowner and under consideration by farmer are allocated to base acreage. In other words only L
represents only base acreage, thus only base acreage can be put into production in this model.
11 I do not explicitly ignore the impact on the competitive output price P ( ) that would arise systematically
from the ultimate reduction in consumer demand stemming from the redistribution of wealth from the
required tax. An interesting extension would be to explicitly identify the derived demand the facing the
farmer, include the social planner as an active player, and solve for the optimal subsidy.
10

36

By taking the first order conditions of profit equation (24) and simultaneously
solving for the optimal input quantities results in the farmer’s coupled subsidy factor
demands
 CS aP(  1)   wS    wL
 LF 
bP( 2  1)


 S CS  aP(  1)   ( wL   )  wS
.
 F
bP( 2  1)

(25)

Notice with the addition of the coupled subsidy that the factor demands are no
longer symmetric as was the case with no-subsidy policy. This result is due to the
coupling of the subsidy to only one input market (in this case land). To confirm the
impact of the coupled subsidy on the factor demands, I take the comparative static of the
factor demand for land and seed (25) with respect to the size of the subsidy, the results
are

dLCS
1
F

 0  (b, P)  0 and -1    0 ,
d bP( 2  1)

(26)

dS FCS


 0  (b, P)  0 and -1    0
d
bP( 2  1)

(27)

and

Therefore, increasing the subsidy increases the demand for both inputs. However,
the increase in factor demand for the non-affiliated complement input (S) is less than that
for the affiliated complement input (L). Note, these results will be important when
discussing the impacts on profitability between the two input suppliers.
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With the farmer’s optimal reaction to prices and a coupled subsidy from stage
two, I return too stage one and the supplier competition. Assuming that the subsidy
program is common knowledge, the input providers take into account the
complementarity of the inputs and the payment mechanism into account as they seek to
maximize profit. By substituting the corresponding factor demands (25) into the
respective supplier profit (24), we find the input supplier’s Bertrand reaction functions
are now

 CS 1
 wL  2 (aP(1   )    wS )

 wCS  1 (aP(1   )   ( w   )
L
 S
2
.

Figure 7

(28)

The Bertrand Reaction Functions of the Seed Manufacture and Landowner
w (w )
in Terms of l S in the Presence of an Input Subsidy on the Rental Rate
of Land

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and  = -1
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Notice in the above figure (7) that the landowner and seed firm’s reaction
functions are positively impacted from higher subsidies regardless of the technical
substitutability between the competitors output. As such, the coupled subsidy necessarily
raises equilibrium prices.
Simultaneous solution of reaction functions (28) results in subgame perfect
equilibrium (CSE) prices for land (rental rate) and seed

 CSE aP( 2    2)   ( 2  2)
 wL 
( 2  4)


2
 wCSE  aP(    2)  
 S
( 2  4)
.

.

(29)

CSE
CSE
It is the case that wL  wS  0  (a, P,  )  0 and -1    0 . Therefore, the coupled

subsidy conveys a strategic pricing advantage to the affiliated firm (L).
Next, by taking the comparative static of (29) in relation to the subsidy, it is
observable that

 dwLCSE ( 2  2)
 2
>0

(  4)
 d
 CSE
 dwS  
0
 d
( 2  4)
,

(30)

are positive when inputs are technical complements. Therefore, both equilibrium input
prices rise relative to an increase in the subsidy, but more so in the affiliated market (L).
As can be seen in figure 8, in relation to the no and fixed subsidy policies the price for
land (affiliated input) and seed (non-affiliated input) are higher for all degrees of
technical complementarity under a coupled subsidy policy.
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Figure 8

Coupled subsidy Equilibrium Prices vs. NS and FS

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and   1
I address, next, the input quantity decision by the farmer in the second stage. By
substitution of the corresponding input providers’ subgame perfect equilibrium prices
(29) into the farmer factor demands (25) results in the asymmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium input quantities

 CSE aP( 2    2)   ( 2  2)
 LF 
bP( 4  5 2  4)


2
 S CSE  aP(    2)  
 F
bP( 4  5 2  4)
.

(31)

Taking the comparative static of (31) in relation to the coupled subsidy payment,
it is observable under conventional parameters that
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 dLCSE
2 2
F


>0
 d
bP(4  5 2  4)

 CSE

 dS F  
>0
 d
bP(4  5 2  4)

(32)
.

CSE
CSE
Additionally, it is true that LF  SF  0  (a, P,  )  0 and -1    0 .

Therefore, the coupled subsidy also conveys a strategic output advantage to the affiliated
firm (L). As perceived in figure 9, the equilibrium quantity of land (affiliated input) and
seed (non-affiliated input) is greater for all degrees of technical complementarity under a
coupled subsidy policy in relation to a no and fixed subsidy policies.

Figure 9

Coupled Subsidy policy Equilibrium Factor Quantities

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and   1
In relation to sector profits, by substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect
equilibrium prices (29) and quantities (31) into the profit function (24) results in the
farmer’s equilibrium profit
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2a 2 P 2   1  2   2aP   1  2    2  3 2  4 
2



CSE
F



2

2bP   4    1
2

2

2

 0  -1    0 .

(33)

By taking the comparative static of the farmer’s profit (33) in relation to the
coupled subsidy, it is observable that
 FCSE
2 (4  3 2 )

0 ,

2bP(4   2 )2 (1   2 )

(34)

for conventional parameters. It can also be shown that the famer’s profit is strictly
convex for appropriate restrictions on the parameters and reaches a minimum at   0 .
By substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium prices (29) and
quantities (31) into the landowner and seed firm profit functions (11) results in the
suppliers equilibrium profits




 2   2   aP  2     2 
 CSE  
2
 L
bP  4   2  1   2 


(  aP( 2    2)) 2
CSE
 S 
bP( 2  4) 2 (1   2 )




2

> 0  -1    0

(35)
> 0  -1    0

.

By taking the comparative static of the farmer’s profit (35) in relation to the
coupled subsidy, it is observable that



  CSE 2(2   2 )  (2   2 )  aP  2     2 
 L 
2
 
bP  4   2  1   2 

  SCSE 2 (  aP(2     2 ))

>0

bP(1   2 )(4   2 ) 2
 

for conventional parameters.
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>0

(36)
.

Figure 4.9 summarizes the profits of the farmer (33), landowner and seed firm
(35). As can be seen, the farmer’s profit is strictly less than either input suppliers for
relatively close technical complement inputs. However, as inputs become close
substitutes, the farm’s profit improves relative to both suppliers, for most values of the
subsidy. As expected from the result of optimal pricing, the supplier in the non-affiliated
market (S) suffers a competitive disadvantage in profitability relative to the affiliated firm
(L).

Figure 10

Coupled Subsidy Equilibrium Profits of Farmer, Landowner and Seed Firm

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and   1
Summary of Sector Welfare Distribution Per Subsidy Policy
Next, to gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the no-subsidy policy,
fixed and coupled subsidy, I analyze the distribution of the total sector surplus in relation
to product substitutability calculated as
43

siNSE 

i
i  (1, n) .
 n

(37)

No Subsidy Policy
First, in the no-subsidy case, by substitution of relevant profit equations (18) and
(20) into sector surplus equation (37), we find the farmer’s equilibrium share of sector
surplus is

sFNSE 

1
3  2 ,

(38)

whereas the seed firm and landowner’s equilibrium shares are

sLNSE  sSNSE 

 1
2  3 .

(39)

Note the share distribution is independent of the output price the relative elasticity of the
factors. These results would not hold if parameters, a and/or b, were allowed to vary
across inputs.
Figure 11, shows how an increase in technical substitutability (   0 ) strictly
increases (decreases) the farmer’s (input suppliers’) percentage share of sector surplus at
an increasing (decreasing) rate. As such, surplus distribution is the poorest for the farmer
when inputs are relatively close complements. However, as demonstrated in figure 10,
the farmer’s profits are the highest for relatively close complements. In all, the modeling
approach identifies the tension between market power, realized surplus and surplus
distribution, all driven by the complementarity of the inputs. In the sections that follow, I
will demonstrate the impact these tensions will have on sector welfare in the presence of
a positive subsidy.
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Figure 11

No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Percentage Sector Surplus Distribution of Farmer
and Input Suppliers

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and   1
Fixed Subsidy Policy
I examine the welfare distribution in the presence of a fixed subsidy. First I
calculate the total available as

s FSE 

a 2 P(3  2 )  bG(2   ) 2 (1   )
,
b(2   )2 (1   )

(40)

and has a constant rate of impact on the sector surplus which is equivalent to G.
By substitution of the farmer’s fixed subsidy (23) and input supplier’s profit (20)
into profit share (37) results in the farmer’s equilibrium share of sector surplus of

a 2 P  bG  2    1   
2

s

FSE
F



bG  2    1     a 2 P  3  2 
2
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,

(41)

sFFSE
2a 2bP(2   ) 2 (1   2 )
 2
(a P(3  2 )  bG(2   ) 2 (1   )) 2 with respect to G.
and increase at a rate of G
The input suppliers’ equilibrium share of sector surplus is

s

FSE
L

and decreases at a rate of

s

FSE
S

sLFSE
,S
G



a 2 P 1   
bG  2    1     a 2 P  3  2  ,



2

(42)

a 2 P(1   )
with respect to a
a 2 P(3  2 )  bG(2   ) 2 (1   )

NSE
FSE
NSE
FSE
fixed lump sum payment of G. Notice that when G  0 , sF  sF and sL, S  sL,S .

Figure 12 demonstrates that the fixed subsidy has (i) a positive impact on available sector
surplus, (ii) a positive impact on the farmer’s share, and (iii) a negative impact on input
suppliers’ share.

Figure 12

Fixed Subsidy Relative Profit Shares In Comparison to No Subsidy Profit
Shares

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and G=1
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Coupled subsidy
To gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the coupled subsidy, with
substitution of firm profits (33) and (35) into the denominator of (37) I demonstrate that
sector total surplus available in the market (given, market is in equilibrium) with a
coupled subsidy is

 2  12  9 2  2 4    2a 2 P 2  2aP   1    2     3  2 
2

s

CSE



2bP  4   2   1   2 

(43)

2

.

The multiplier effect of the coupled subsidy can then be calculated as
2
4
s CSE   12  9  2   aP  1    2     3  2 

 1  -1    0 .
2

bP  4   2   1   2 
2

(44)

Although the coupled subsidy resulted in higher input prices, the expansion affect
in input quantity results in a positive multiplier effect. Figure 13 demonstrates that the
multiplier effect diminishes as input substitutability increases and is strictly greater than
the fixed subsidy policy.
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Figure 13

Multiplier Effect on Total Sector Surplus In the Presence of a Coupled
Subsidy

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and α=1
The equilibrium profit share is for the farmer, landowner and seed firm are

s

CSE
F



 2  4  3 2   (2a 2 P 2  2aP )  1    2   

2

 2 12  9 2  2 4    2a 2 P 2  2aP   1    2     3  2  ,
2

(45)

and





2

2   2   2   aP  2     2 
CSE
s 
2
 L
 2 12  9 2  2 4   (2a 2 P 2  2aP )  1    2     3  2 


2
2

2


aP

2






 sSCSE 
2

 2 12  9 2  2 4   (2a 2 P 2  2aP )  1    2     3  2 

.





(46)

Finally, I demonstrate in figure 14 that the subsidy distribution disproportionally
improves the affiliated input market (L) over the non-affiliated input market (S).
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Figure 14

Coupled Subsidy Relative Profit Shares

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1
Now, I graphically summarize the subsidy incidence, as defined by the resulting
sector welfare distribution, from the three subsidy policies (no, fixed and coupled) on
sector welfare distribution. Figure 15 demonstrates that the famer realizes the greatest
improvement in percent surplus share under the fixed subsidy policy, more so as inputs
become closer substitutes. Interestingly, though the farmer’s profits increase under a
coupled subsidy policy, the improvement in surplus distribution is modest in relation to
no-subsidy policy. Overall, the improvement in the farmer’s surplus distribution as
inputs become closer substitutes is due to the Bertrand competition between the input
suppliers.
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Figure 15

Famer’s Retention of Sector Surplus (i.e. Profit Share) Over Three
Alternative Subsidy Policies

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=1 and α=1
Figure 16 provides a graphical summary of the percent distribution of total sector
surplus for the landowner and seed firm across the various subsidy policies. For all
policies, the landowner and seed firm have nearly unchanging and symmetric surplus
shares when the inputs are nearly perfect complements. As inputs become closer
substitutes, however, under a fixed subsidy policy, input supplier surplus shares are
symmetrically lower than the no-subsidy. Under a coupled subsidy policy, the
affiliated/non-affiliated input supplier’s surplus distribution is greater/less than both the
no and fixed subsidy policy. Overall, the degenerative surplus distribution as inputs
become closer substitutes is due to the Bertrand competition between the input suppliers.
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Figure 16

Landowner and Seed Firm Profit Shares Over Three Alternative Subsidy
Policies

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=84 and α=1
Dominate Buyer (DB): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer vs. a Monopsonist Farmer
Market power scenario two occurs when the buyer (farmer) dominates the market
and forces the landowner (seller) to accept the set price. Accordingly, the farmer will
force the landowner to sell at his marginal cost and in this case, price is determined to be
zero due to the underlying assumptions of the model. Specifically, the input suppliers
have zero marginal cost and equating marginal cost to marginal profit (i.e. price) is the
profit maximizing point when the landowner is perfectly competitive and is subject to the
farmer’s market power. In this model, the seed firm is still acting as a monopolist over
their respective complementary good, thus they are taking the complementarity of two
goods into account when they maximize profit.
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The details and step-by-step solutions for all three subsidy policies are outlined as
followed. The section begins with derivation of the baseline scenario, a market with no
subsidy policy. The no subsidy case is followed by a fixed lump sum payment
mechanism then finally the coupled subsidy mechanism. After all theoretical solutions
are derived; the surplus distributions of all three policy cases will be discussed.
No Subsidy Policy (NS_DB)
The industry structure and competitive relationship assumptions are as follows.
To begin, the representative farmer remains a profit maximizer. I maintain the
assumption that the farmer takes output price (P) and input cost of seed as given.
However, in the dominate buyer case the famer sets the price of land.
I first derive the results when there is no subsidy policy in place and this
represents the baseline of comparison to other subsidy policies. To start, I substitute the
dominate buyer price of land into the Bertrand reaction functions (14). Using the
reactions function from the dominate seller case and substituting 0 for the cost of land
results in

wS NSE _ DB 

1
(aP  aP ) .
2

(47)

Equation (47) is the reaction function of the seed manufacture to the price set for
land by the farmer. It is also the subgame perfect equilibrium price for the seed
manufacture because the price of land is zero. Therefore, the seed supplier optimally
exerts market power and as in the dominate seller (DS) caser chooses price above

dwLNSE _ DB aP
aP dwLNSE

 0 and

0 ,
marginal costs. It is interesting to note that
d
2
d
2
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for all conventional restrictions of parameter values. Therefore, the degree of market
power is a function of substitutability and the effect of a change in substitutability in the
dominate buyer case is larger than in the original dominate seller case. As depicted
below in figure 17 the seed supplier’s ability, in the dominate buyer scenario, to set prices
above those in the dominate seller case, increases as   1.

Figure 17

No-Subsidy Dominate Buyer: Equilibrium Input Prices

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1.
Given the equilibrium prices from stage one; I now return to stage two, the
farmer’s equilibrium choices of input quantities and resulting profit. By substitution of
the equilibrium, input price equation (47) into factor demand equations (7) results in the
equilibrium quantities of land and seed,
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 NSE _ DB 2a  a
> 0  -1<  1, a > 0, and b  0

L
2b(1   )


a
 S NSE _ DB 
> 0  -1<  1, a > 0, and b  0

2b(1   )
.

(48)

It is important to note that the relationship between input substitutability and optimal
inputs purchased is strictly convex as

 2 S FNSE _ DB 2a  a

 0  (a, b) > 0 and -1<
b(1   )3
 2
.

(49)

Figure 18 demonstrates this convex relationship over the range of input
complementarity. Specifically, it shows that an increase in complementarity increases
optimal factor quantity, thus substitutability and quantity have an inverse relation.

Figure 18

NSE (Dominate Buyer) Factor Quantities of Farmer Facing Bertrand
Competitors for a Range of Compliments

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1
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Therefore, as technical complementarity increases, the optimal input quantities
increase. Furthermore, by extension it is necessary that the commodity output increases
per the farmer’s technology (1). By comparing figures 17 and 18, it is readily apparent
that increasing technical complementarity increases both market power and production.
The output result is not intuitively obvious as increasing market power typically results in
lower outputs, and hence reduced surplus to the buyer.
Next, I will examine the impacts of technical input complementarity on the
profitability of farmer, and then input suppliers. Starting with the Farmer, by substitution
of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (47) and quantities (48)
into the farmer’s profit function (3) I find the farmer’s equilibrium profit when he is a
dominate buyer of land as



NSE _ DB
F

a 2 P(5  3 )

 0> 0  P>0, -1<  0, a > 0, and b  0 .
8b(1   )

(50)

The farmer’s equilibrium profit is strictly concave as

d 2 FNSE _ DB
a2 P

 0  (a, b, P)  0 and  1    0 .
d 2
2b(1   )3

(51)

As can be seen in figure 19,  FNSE _ DB   FNSE for all conventional parameters, thus
the farmer benefits when he market power, regardless of the degree of complimentarily.
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Figure 19

Optimal Profit of Farmer Facing Bertrand Competitors for Dominate Buyer
and Dominate Seller Market Power Cases

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1
Next, looking at upstream input suppliers, by substitution of the corresponding
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (47) and quantities (48) into the
supplier’s profit functions (11) I find the equilibrium profit of the land supplier, given the
price of land is set at marginal cost and the equilibrium profit of seed supplier are

 SNSE _ DB  0

 NSE _ DB
a 2 P(1   )



 0  P  0,  1    1, b  0, and a  0
 S
4b(1   )

.

(52)

It is the case that seed supplier profit is strictly decreasing in the substitutability of their
input as

d SNSE
a 2 P

 0  (a, b, P)  0 and  1    0 .
d
2b(1   2 )
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(53)

As can be seen in figure 20, for various degrees of input complementarity, the
highest profit for the seed manufacture occurs when the farmer is a dominate buyer in the
land rental market, when input products are nearly perfect complements.

Figure 20

NSE Optimal Profit of Farmer and Input Suppliers (Land and Seed)

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1
Interestingly by comparing figures 19 and 20, the increase in the seed firms
market power (which results from the farmers gain of market power in the land market)
as indicated by higher input prices, results in higher, not lower, buyer profits. The reason
for this apparently counter intuitive result is due to the expansionary effects in
input/output depicted in figure 18 as input complementarity increases. Therefore, buyer
surplus increases when inputs are close complements and to a greater degree when
market power is transferred to the buyer. Again, increasing the complementarity between
technical inputs i) increases market power, ii) unilaterally increases sector surplus, but
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iii) decreases available sector surplus. However, in the dominate buyer scenario
increasing complementarity allows the seed supplier to exert an ‘even’ more aggressive
pricing strategy.
Fixed subsidy Policy (FS)
The first subsidy analyzed is a decoupled payment mechanism, which is
commonly referred to as a fixed subsidy. Given the assumed separable influence of G,
subsequent subgame perfect solutions of the dynamic game outlined in the previous
section will equal those observed under the no-subsidy policy. By substitution of the
subgame perfect input prices (47) and quantities (48) into the farmer’s profit (22), the
farmer’s new equilibrium profit is

 FNSE _ DB 

a 2 P(5  3 )
+G > 0  P>0, -1<  0, a > 0, and b  0 .
8b(1   )

(54)

The direct effect of decoupled payments is that the fixed subsidy improves the
farmer’s sector surplus and does not distort input market prices and quantities under the
assumption that G is a separable influence on the farmer’s investment decision.
Furthermore, it is true that the NSE of the in the DB case is greater than in the DS market
power situation.
Coupled subsidy Policy (CS)
Moving forward with the dominate buyer case; I will now address the changes in
the presence of the coupled subsidy policy. To solve for the case where the buyer
(farmer) has complete monopsony power in the land market with the addition of a
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coupled subsidy. I substitute the monopsony price of land (zero) into the seed firm’s
reaction function (28) which result in

1
wSCSE _ DB  (aP(1   )   ) .
2

(55)

This is the reaction function of the seed manufacture to the landowner. It is also the
subgame perfect equilibrium price for seed when the farmer is able to set the price of land
to zero from his complete monopsony power in the land market. By taking the
comparative static of (55) in relation to the subsidy, it is observed that

wSCSE _ DB
1
    0  1    0 .

2

(56)

Thus, the coupled subsidy tied to the quantity of land strategically allows the seed
supplier to raise the price of their input, as

wSCSE _ DB wSCSE

, for all conventional



parameters.
Figure 21 maps the optimal price of the seed provider in relation to a range of
substitutability. The seed provider is able to charge a higher price for some (higher)
degrees of complementary between inputs. Furthermore, the seed supplier is better off in
the dominate buyer case when the inputs are close to perfect complements since it is
optimal for him to choose a higher price in relation to the price he was able to choose
when the landowner held monopoly power.
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Figure 21

The Bertrand Seed Manufacture Optimal Price of Seed Over Varying
Substitutability for the Dominate Seller and Buyer Cases

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and α=1
The input quantity decision by the farmer occurring in stage two follows. By
substitution of the corresponding input providers’ subgame perfect equilibrium prices
(55) into the farmer factor demands (25) results in the asymmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium input quantities

 CSE _ DB  (2   2 )  aP(2     2 )

 L
2bP(1   2 )

 S CSE _ DB  aP  aP  
2bP  2bP 2


(57)
.

_ DB
It can be shown that LCSE
 SFCSE _ DB  0  (a, P,  )  0 and -1    0 .
F

Therefore, the coupled subsidy also conveys a strategic output advantage to the affiliated
firm (L). However, since the landowner now takes price as given, the landowner is not
able to capitalize on this advantage. As demonstrated in figure 22, the equilibrium
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quantity of land (affiliated input) and seed (non-affiliated input) are greater for all
degrees of technical complementarity under a coupled subsidy policy in relation to a no
and fixed subsidy policies. Additionally, by comparing figure 22 with figure 9 it is
observable that the equilibrium quantity of land and seed are greater in the dominate
buyer case.

Figure 22

Optimal Factor Quantities of Dominate Buyer (Farmer) for a Range of
Compliments

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1)
In relation to sector profits, by substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect
equilibrium prices (55) and quantities (57) into the profit function (20) results in the
farmer’s equilibrium profit



CSE _ DM
F

a 2 P 2 (1   )(5  3 )   2 (4  3 2 )  2aP (4    3 2 )

8bP(1   2 )
.
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(58)

Additionally, as shown in figure 23 the farmer’s profit is strictly convex for
appropriate restrictions on the parameters and reaches a minimum at   0 , as was the
case in the when the seller had complete market power over land. To address the impact
of  on the farmer’s profit (58), I use the comparative statistic with respect to the
coupled subsidy,

 FCSE _ DM 2 (4  3 2 )  2aP (4    3 2 )

0

8bP(1   2 )
,

(59)

for all conventional parameters.
In Figure 23 the farmer’s monopsony profit is shown in relation to the price
taking profit of the farmer for a range of substitutability. The farmer’s profit is strictly
improved in this dominate buyer case in comparison to when he was subject to a
dominate seller. Thus, the ability to drive land prices to marginal cost provides the
farmer with a greater surplus.
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Figure 23

CSE Profits of Farmer in the Dominate Buyer vs. Dominate Seller Cases

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1
By substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium prices (55) and
quantities (57) into the landowner and seed firm profit functions (11) results in the
suppliers equilibrium profits
 LCSE _ DB  0

 CSE _ DB
(aP(1   )   ) 2

> 0  -1    0
 S
4bP(1   2 )
.


(60)

Next, I will use the comparative statistic to analyze the impact of the subsidy on
the seed supplier’s profit (60),

 SCSE _ DB  (aP  (ap   ) )

>0

4bP(1   2 )2
,
for all conventional parameters.
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(61)

Figure 24 summarizes the profits of the seed firm for the dominate buyer and
dominate seller cases, for the range of technical input complementarity. The seed firm
greatly benefits when the farmer is a dominate buyer for all values of complementarity
(but note no difference when inputs are technically independent). Furthermore, the
benefits gained by the seed from increase as complementarity increases. Thus, the nonaffiliated supplier receives a large positive spillover effects when i) supplying a nearly
perfect complement to the affiliated input and ii) the buyer holds market power in the
affiliated complementary input market.

Figure 24

CSE Seed Firms Profit In Dominate Buyer Case vs Dominate Seller

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1
Summary of Sector Welfare Distribution Per Subsidy Policy
Again, to gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the no-subsidy policy,
fixed and coupled subsidy, I analyze the distribution of the total sector surplus in relation
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to product substitutability (34). First, in the no-subsidy case, by substitution of relevant
profit equations (51) and (52) into sector surplus equation (37), I find the farmer’s
equilibrium share of sector surplus is

sFNSE _ DB 

5  3
7  ,

(62)

whereas the seed firm and landowner’s equilibrium shares are
 sLNSE _ DB  0

 NSE _ DB 2(  1)

 sS
7  .


(63)

As demonstrated in figure 25, as technical complementarity decreases (increases)
the farmer (suppliers) percentage of sector share of sector surplus increases (decreases) at
an decreasing (increasing) rate. As such, surplus distribution is the poorest for the farmer
when inputs are relatively perfect complements, just as is the case when the farmer is
subject to a dominate seller in the land rental market. However, as demonstrated earlier,
the farmer’s profits are the highest for relatively close complements. Additionally, the
seed manufacture (for σ < -0.3) and farmer (for all values of σ) are mutually better off, in
comparison to the dominate seller case. The seed supplier is able to more than half of
the sector surplus when the farmer is able to force the rental rate of land to the
landowners marginal cost, when then goods approach nearly perfect complements.
Inversely, the famer gains an advantage as the inputs increase in substitutability. In all,
our modeling approach identifies the tension between market power, realized surplus and
surplus distribution, all driven by the complementarity of the inputs. In the sections that
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follow, I will demonstrate the impact these tensions will have on sector welfare in the
presence of a positive input subsidy.

Figure 25

NSE Relative Optimal Profit Share of Farmer and Bertrand Competitors in
Dominate Buyer vs Dominate Seller

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, and b=1
I examine the welfare distribution in the presence of a fixed subsidy, by
substitution of the farmer’s fixed subsidy profit (54) and input supplier’s profit (52) into
profit share (37). This results in the farmer’s equilibrium share of sector surplus of

sFFSE _ DB 

8bG(1   )  a 2 P(5  3 )
8bG(1   )  a 2 P(7   ) .

Taking the competitive static of (64), in relation to the fixed subsidy, it is
observable that
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(64)

sFFSE _ DB
16a 2bP( 2  1)

0
G
(8bG(1   )  a 2 P(7   )) 2
,

(65)

for all conventional parameters and G not equal to 0.
The input suppliers’ equilibrium share of sector surplus is given as
 sLFSE _ DB  0

 FSE _ DB
2a 2 P(  1)
s


 S
8bG (1   )  a 2 P(7   ) ,


(66)

NSE _ DB
_ DB
NSE _ DB
 sLFSE
 sFFSE _ DB and sL,S
,S
and notice that when G  0 , sF
. Figure 26

demonstrates that the fixed subsidy, as in the dominate seller case, has (i) a positive
impact on the farmer’s share, and (ii) a negative impact on input suppliers’ share.
However, the famer’s gain in market power has a strictly positive impact on the farmer’s
profit share as compared to the dominate seller case (Figure 12).

Figure 26

Fixed Subsidy Relative Profit Shares In Comparison to No Subsidy Profit
Shares

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and G=1
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Next, to gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the coupled subsidy,
with substitution of the farmer and supplier profits (58) and (60) into the denominator of
(34) I demonstrate that sector total surplus available in the market (given, market is in
equilibrium) with a coupled subsidy is

sCSE _ DB 

2aP (  1)(4   )  a 2 P 2 (  1)(7   )   2 ( 2  4)
8bP( 2  1)
.

(67)

The multiplier effect of the coupled subsidy can then be calculated as

sCSE _ DB 2aP(  1)(4   )  2 ( 2  4)

 1  -1    0

8bP( 2  1)
,

(68)

and is strictly convex with respect to the coupled subsidy. Although the coupled subsidy
resulted in higher input prices, the expansion affect in input quantity results in a positive
multiplier effect. Figure 27 demonstrates that the multiplier effect diminishes as input
substitutability increases and is strictly greater than the fixed subsidy policy.
Additionally, the multiplier effect on total sector surplus is strictly greater in dominate
buyer case, than the dominate seller case (figure 13)
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Figure 27

Multiplier Effect on Total Sector Surplus In the Presence of a Coupled
Subsidy

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and α=1
The equilibrium profit share is for the farmer, landowner and seed firm are

a 2 P 2 (1   )(5  3 )   2 (4  3 2 )  2aP (4    3 2 )
2aP (1   )(4   )  a 2 P 2 (1   )(7   )   2 (4   2 ) ,

(69)

 sLCSE _ DB  0

 CSE _ DB
2(aP(1   )   ) 2
s


 S
2aP (1   )(4   )  a 2 P 2 (1   )(7   )   2 ( 2  4) .


(70)

sFCSE _ DB 
and

Finally, I demonstrate in figure 28 that the subsidy distribution inversely improves
for the farmer and seed firm with addition of the coupled subsidy. The subsidy does not
impact the profit share of the farmer nor seed supplier when the inputs are near perfect
complements; and the seed supplier and farmer are strictly better off in comparison to
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dominate seller case. Thus, the seed firm is able to extract more of the spillover effects
from the subsidy payment, when the famer gains monopsony power in the land market.
In all, the important conclusion is when a famer gains countervailing market power it
mainly benefits the upstream monopoly, in this case the seed manufacture.

Figure 28

Coupled Subsidy Relative Profit Shares

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1
Now, I graphically summarize the subsidy incidence, as defined by the resulting
sector welfare distribution, from the three subsidy policies (no, fixed and coupled) on
sector welfare distribution. Figure 29 demonstrates that the famer realizes the greatest
improvement in percent surplus share under the coupled subsidy policy, more so as inputs
become closer substitutes. This is a change from the dominate seller case, in which the
fixed subsidy provide the famer with the greatest retention of the subsidy and sector
surplus. Interestingly, unlike the dominate seller case the farmer’s profits increase under
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a coupled subsidy policy, and the farmer realizes an improvement in surplus distribution
compared to the other polices. The improvement in the farmer’s surplus distribution as
inputs become closer substitutes is due to the Bertrand competition between the input
suppliers, and the new power retained by the farmer in the land market. As a result, the
farmer is able to capture (although it is only a portion) added surplus from the addition of
the coupled subsidy that was extracted by the landowner in the dominate seller case.

Figure 29

Famer’s Retention of Sector Surplus (i.e. Profit Share) Over Three
Alternative Subsidy Policies

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=1 and α=1
Figure 30 provides a graphical summary of the percent distribution of total sector
surplus for the seed firm across the various subsidy policies. For all policies, the seed
firm has nearly unchanging and symmetric surplus shares when the inputs are nearly
perfect complements. As inputs become closer substitutes, however, under a fixed
subsidy policy, input supplier surplus shares are lower than the no-subsidy. Overall, the
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degenerative surplus distribution as inputs become closer substitutes is due to the
Bertrand competition between the input suppliers.

Figure 30

Seed Firm Profit Shares Over Three Alternative Subsidy Policies

Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=1 and α=1
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS

Experimental markets can be designed to study the economics of decision making in an
existing trading institution, i.e. land and seed market for agriculture commodity
production. Generally, development of laboratory markets are key to providing empirical
evidence to support (or not) theoretical expectations related to market behaviors (Davis
and Holt, 1993). Sufficient empirical evidence of subsidy incidence is lacking primarily
due to the lack of adequate data to test theoretical predictions. Experimental economics
also allows researchers to control for extraneous factors and compare policy options. The
Organization for Economic and Development notes, “a potential avenue for research in
the area [of investigating farmer’s expectations concerning policy] could come from
applying some experimental economics” (OECD, 2005).
Using the partial equilibrium game theoretic model for the dominate sellers, I will
determine how the interaction of the two input suppliers, in technically separate markets,
affects i) prices, ii) profits (i.e. payoffs in the laboratory market), iii) percent of sector
surplus retention; across three alternative subsidy polices in the laboratory market and iv)
sector welfare. Using theory as the guide to design the experiments allows for the
construction of identifiable testable hypotheses. This chapter is laid out as follows. In
the experimental design section, I will outline the hypotheses, and design of the three
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treatments. This will then be followed by a brief review of the laboratory market
procedures used to conduct the experiment.
Experimental Design
The laboratory market is a controlled experimental environment, allowing for the
isolation of specific variables that induce a change in subject behavior, and therefore
market outcomes. Changes in the laboratory setting are made to conduct policy treatment
hypothesis testing. However, for valid hypothesis testing, it is imperative to keep the
market ‘true’ to the theory. Thus, I design the experiment to include the fundamentals of
the production process and trading mechanisms that are embedded within the theoretical
modelling framework. This permits the laboratory market to test for causality of the
economic factors of interest. In all, even though the laboratory market setting does not
account for all production complexities of the industry sector, the results are will still
informative.
Developing the Hypotheses
In the classical Bertrand differentiated products model, Bertrand non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium prices are above marginal cost . The dynamic 2-stage theoretical model
uses the best response functions of the input suppliers, thus providing a unique subgame
perfect prediction for each player’s strategy. This section first outlines the analytical
results for an assumed set of parameters. The results are then used to formulate the
testable hypotheses.
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Analytical Results
I provide a general description of the dominant seller models (depicted in
equations 15,16,18,20,23,29,31,33,35,38,39,41,42,45 and 46) for a given set of
parameters, which are: P=1, a=2, b=1, σ = -0.99, G=84, and α=1. I outline the
analytical results of the dominate seller outcomes for the no subsidy, fix subsidy and
coupled subsidy policies. The most important assumption I make is the near perfect
technical complementarity between land and seed to represent the importance they have
to one another in the production process.
The results demonstrate that only the farmer’s surplus rises with a fixed payment.
However, under a coupled policy input prices, input quantities, profits, and sector surplus
(welfare) rise. Interestingly, with nearly perfect technical complement inputs, the subsidy
payment under a coupled policy is less than the increase in sector welfare; whereas, the
increase in welfare is equal to the subsidy payment for the fixed subsidy policy. Thus,
only the coupled subsidy payment results in a multiplier effect.
I will first present the expected equilibriums for the no subsidy case (NS), then
move to the fixed subsidy (FS) and conclude with the coupled subsidy (CS) predictions.
No Subsidy Policy Equilibrium Predictions (NSE)
Given the set of parameters previously noted, in Table 1 I provide the No subsidy
equilibrium (NSE) predictions for prices, profits and welfare distributions.
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Table 1

No Subsidy Policy Equilibrium (NSE) Predictions
Variable

NSE Prediction

Price of Land

1.3311

Price of Seed

1.3311

Farmer Profit

44.74

Landowner Profit

89.03

Seed Supplier Profit

89.03

Farmer Percent of Sector Surplus

20%

Landowner Percent of Sector Surplus

40%

Seed Supplier Percent of Sector Surplus
Parameter Assumptions: P=1, a=2, b=1, and σ=-0.99

40%

Fixed Subsidy Policy Equilibrium Predictions (FSE)
In Table 2 I present the Fixed Subsidy Equilibrium (FSE) predictions of prices,
profits and welfare distributions. The decoupled mechanism consists of the Buyer
receiving an external source of revenue for 84 tokens. This payment of 84 tokens is
assumed to allow for comparisons with the coupled subsidy treatment because in
equilibrium the buyer receives approximately 84 tokens from the coupled subsidy.
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Table 2

Fixed Subsidy Policy Equilibrium (FSE) Predictions
Variable

FSE Prediction

Price of Land

1.3311

Price of Seed

1.3311

Farmer Profit

128.74

Landowner Profit

89.03

Seed Supplier Profit

89.03

Total Sector Surplus

306.82

Farmer Percent of Sector Surplus

42%

Landowner Percent of Sector Surplus

29%

Seed Supplier Percent of Sector Surplus
Parameter Assumptions P=1, a=2, b=1, σ=-0.99, and G=84

29%

Coupled Subsidy Policy Equilibrium Predictions (CSE)
In Table 3 I provide the coupled subsidy equilibrium (CSE) predictions for prices,
profits and welfare distributions.
Table 3

Coupled Subsidy Policy Equilibrium (CSE) Predictions
Variable

CSE Prediction

Price of Land

1.669

Price of Seed

1.659

Farmer Profit

70.04

Landowner Profit

139.95

Seed Supplier Profit

138.29

Farmer Percent of Sector Surplus

20%

Landowner Percent of Sector Surplus

40.2%

Seed Supplier Percent of Sector Surplus
Parameter Assumptions P=1, a=2, b=1, σ = -0.99, and α=1
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39.8%

Hypotheses
The hypotheses are formed from the theoretical predictions per policy and for
comparison across the alternative subsidy policies. The alternative subsidy policies
represent the experimental treatments. I will first present the hypothesis relating to the
theoretical predictions of prices, payoffs and welfare distributions for the NSE, FSE and
CSE. This will be followed by hypotheses concerning the differences of prices, profits
and welfare across the alternative subsidy polies (i.e. the treatment effect).
Hypothesis: Theoretical Predictions
Using Tables 1, 2, and 3, I formulate the numeric predictions for my hypotheses.
I first present prices across all three subsidy policies, in Table 4 and conclude with
presenting the hypotheses for welfare distributions in Table 6.
Price Hypotheses
In table 4 I mathematically present the four null hypotheses, which relate to the
pricing strategies (decisions) of the input suppliers.
i. Price Hypothesis One: From the theoretical predictions, in a market with
no subsidy, the landowner’s pricing decision will not statistically differ
from 1.33. In addition, difference between the price of land and price of
seed will not statistically deviate from zero.
ii. Price Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed
subsidy policy is introduced into the market, the landowner’s pricing
decision will not statistically differ from 1.33. And difference between the
price of land and price of seed will not statistically deviate from zero.
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iii. Price Hypothesis Three: From the theoretical predictions, in the coupled
subsidy policy the landowner will make a pricing decision that does not
statistically differ from 1.67.
iv. Price Hypothesis Four: From the theoretical predictions, in the coupled
subsidy policy the seed supplier will make pricing decisions that not
statistically differ from 1.66.
Table 4

Price Hypothesis From Theoretical Predictions

Price Hypothesis
i.

Subsidy Policy
NSE

ii.

FSE

iii.

CSE

CSE
iv.
Notes: wL  Price of land and wS  Price of Seed

Prediction

wL , ws
1
wL , ws
2
wL
3
ws
4

H
H

: wL  1.33  wS
: wL  1.33  wS
H : wL  1.67
H : wS  1.66

Profits (Payoffs) Hypothesis
In table 5 I mathematically present the seven hypotheses, which relate to the
resulting profits of the farmer and input suppliers across the three subsidies polices.
i. Payoff Hypothesis One: From the theoretical predictions, in the no
subsidy policy case, payoffs earned by the landowner will not statistically
differ from 89.03. And difference between the payoffs earned by the
landowner and seed supplier will not statistically deviate from zero.
ii. Payoff Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when the
market has no subsidy policy the payoffs earned by the famer will not
statistically differ from 44.74.
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iii. Payoff Hypothesis Three: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed
subsidy is introduced into the market the payoffs earned by the landowner
will not statistically differ from 89.03. And difference between the
payoffs earned by the landowner and seed supplier will not statistically
deviate from zero.
iv. Payoff Hypothesis Four: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed
subsidy is introduced into the market the payoffs earned by the famer will
not statistically differ from 128.74.
v. Payoff Hypothesis Five: From the theoretical predictions, when a coupled
subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market the
payoffs earned by the landowner will not statistically differ from 139.95.
vi. Payoff Hypothesis Six: From the theoretical predictions, when a coupled
subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market the
payoffs earned by the seed supplier will not statistically differ from
138.29.
vii. Payoff Hypothesis Seven: From the theoretical predictions, when a
coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market
the payoffs earned by the famer will not statistically differ from 70.04.
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Table 5

Payoff Hypothesis From Theoretical Predictions

Payoff Hypothesis

Subsidy Policy

i.

NSE

ii.

NSE

iii.

FSE

iv.

FSE

v.

CSE

vi.

CSE

vii.

CSE

 L , S

H1

Prediction

:  L  89.03   S
H 2 :  F  44.74
F

H3 L , S :  L  89.03   S
H 4 F :  L  128.74
H5 L :  L  139.95
H 6 S :  S  138.29
H 7 F :  F  70.04

 L  Payoff to Landowner,  S is the payoff to seed supplier, and  F is the payoff of the farmer.

Welfare Distribution Hypothesis
In table 6 I mathematically present the seven hypotheses, which relate to the
resulting welfare distributions of total sector surplus or what percent of the total sector
surplus is retained by famer and input suppliers across the three subsidies polices.
i. Welfare Hypothesis One: From the theoretical predictions, in the no
subsidy policy case the percentage of sector surplus retained by the
landowner will not statistically differ from 40 percent. And difference
between the percent of sector surplus earned by the landowner and seed
supplier will not statistically deviate from zero.
ii. Welfare Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when the
market has no subsidy policy, the famer’s percent of sector surplus will
not statistically differ from 20 percent.
iii. Welfare Hypothesis Three: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed
payment is introduced, the percentage of sector surplus retained by the
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landowner will not statistically differ from 29 percent. And difference
between the percent of sector surplus earned by the landowner and seed
supplier will not statistically deviate from zero.
iv. Welfare Hypothesis Four: From the theoretical predictions, when the
market has the addition of a fixed subsidy payment, the famer’s percent of
sector surplus will not statistically differ from 42 percent.
v. Welfare Hypothesis Five: From the theoretical predictions, when a
coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market,
the percent of sector surplus retained by the landowner will not
statistically differ from 40.2 percent.
vi. Welfare Hypothesis Six: From the theoretical predictions, when a coupled
subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market, the
percent of sector surplus earned by the seed supplier will not statistically
differ from 39.8 percent.
vii. Welfare Hypothesis Seven: From the theoretical predictions, when a
coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market,
the percent of sector surplus earned by the famer will not statistically
differ from 20 percent.
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Table 6

Welfare Hypothesis From Theoretical Predictions

Payoff Hypothesis
i.

Subsidy Policy
NSE

ii.

NSE

iii.

FSE

iv.

FSE

v.

CSE

vi.

CSE

Prediction

H1sL ,sS : sL  0.40  sS
H 2sF : sF  0.20
H3sL ,sS : sL  0.29  sS
H 4sF : sL  0.42
H5sL : sL  0.402
H6sS : sS  0.398
H7sF : sF  0.20

CSE
vii.
Notes:
sL , sS are the the landowner and seed supplier's percent share of sector surplus

and sF is the farmer's share of sector surplus.
Hypothesis: Predictions of Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices
Using Tables 1, 2, and 3, I formulate the numeric predictions of my treatment
effect hypotheses. I first present prices across all three subsidy policies, in Table 7 and
conclude with presenting the hypothesis for welfare distributions in Table 9.
Price Hypotheses
In table 7 I mathematically present the two hypotheses, which relate to the pricing
decisions of the input suppliers and how theory predicts expected prices (i.e. the input
suppliers’ pricing strategies) to change across the alternative policies.
i. Price Hypothesis One: The addition of the fixed subsidy will not
statistically alter the price of land from the non-subsidy case. And the
price of land and price of seed should not statically differ from one
another, as the FSE price of seed should not statistically differ from the
NSE price.
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ii. Price Hypothesis Two: The addition of the coupled subsidy, tied to the
price of land, will result in the input suppliers’ strategically raising prices
above the NSE prices. Thus the CSE prices will be statistically greater
than the NSE prices or land seed.
Table 7

Price Hypothesis Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices (Treatments)

Price Hypothesis

Subsidy Policy
NSE, FSE

i.

NSE, CSE
ii.
Notes: wL  Price of land and wS  Price of Seed

Prediction

H1wL ,ws
H 2wL ,wS

FSE
: wLNSE
,S  wL,S

CSE
: wSNSE
, L  wL,S

Profits (Payoffs) Hypothesis
In table 8 I mathematically present the four hypotheses, which relate the profits of
the farmer and input suppliers and how they change with the interaction of alternative
subsidy policies
i.

Payoff Hypothesis One: The addition of the fixed payment will not
statistically alter the profit of the input providers from the NSE profits.

ii. Payoff Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when the farmer
receives a fixed lump sum payment, the result is an increase in profits,
thus the farmers FSE payoff is greater than the famers NSE payoffs.
iii. Payoff Hypothesis Three: The coupled subsidy tied to the quantity choice
of land will increase the profits of the input suppliers, thus the input
supplier CSE profits will be statistically greater than the NSE profits.
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iv. Payoff Hypothesis Four: The coupled subsidy tied the quantity choice of
land will increase the profits of the farmer, thus the famer’s CSE profits
will be statistically greater than the NSE profits.
Table 8

Payoff Hypothesis Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices (Treatments)

Payoff Hypothesis

Subsidy Policy

i.

NSE, FSE

ii.

NSE, FSE

iii.

NSE, CSE

Prediction

 L , S

FSE
:  LNSE
, S   L, S
H 2 F :  FNSE   FFSE
CSE
H3 L , S :  LNSE
, S C   L, S

H1

F

NSE, CSE
H4 : F   F
iv.
Notes:
 L  Payoff to Landowner,  S is the payoff to seed supplier, and  F is the payoff of the farmer.
NSE

CSE

Welfare Distribution Hypothesis
In table 9 I mathematically present the four hypotheses, which relate the welfare
distributions of the farmer and input suppliers and how they change with the introduction
of alternative subsidy policies.
i.

Welfare Hypothesis One: The addition of the fixed payment will
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the input providers from the
NSE case. Thus, the input supplier FSE percent of sector surplus is
statistically less than the NSE percent of sector surplus.

ii. Payoff Hypothesis Two: The addition of the fixed payment will
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the famer from the NSE case.
Thus, the famer FSE percent of sector surplus is statistically greater than
the NSE percent of sector surplus.
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iii. Welfare Hypothesis Three: The addition of the coupled subsidy will not
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the input providers from the
NSE case.
iv. Payoff Hypothesis Four: The addition of the coupled subsidy will not
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the famer from the NSE case.
Table 9

Welfare Hypothesis Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices (Treatments)

Payoff Hypothesis

Subsidy Policy

i.

NSE, FSE

ii.

NSE, FSE

iii.

NSE, CSE

iv.
Notes:

NSE, CSE

Prediction

H1sL ,sS : ssNSE
 ssFSE
L , sS
L , sS
sF
H 2 : ssNSE
 ssFSE
F
F
sL ,sS
H3 : ssNSE
 ssCSE
L , sS
L , sS
sF
NSE
CSE
H 4 : ssF  ssF

sL , sS are the the landowner and seed supplier's percent of sector surplus
and sF is the farmer's share of sector surplus.

Experimental Design
The experimental market specified within this section follows directly from
developed theory and resulting hypotheses. The elements of a game theory model differ
from other structural modeling techniques by accounting for the strategic interactions
between players. As such, a player’s payoff is not solely dependent upon his actions but
also the actions of others in his trading group. Accordingly, the experiment (treatments
1, 2 and 3) consist of players, possible actions, and a clearly defined set of information
(i.e. rules of the game).
The experiment consists of three treatments, each comprising solely one of the
three conducted sessions. Treatment 1 tested a market with no subsidy policy, treatment
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2 a market in which the famer received a fixed payment, and the treatment 3 a market in
the presence of the coupled subsidy. The experiment, across all three treatments, is a
three-player game involving two input providers and a buyer. The players are denoted as
follows:
i. The landowner as the Seller of product A
ii. The seed firm as the Seller of product B
iii. The famer as the buyer of products A and B, denoted as Buyer C.
Each treatment required 18 subjects, 6 as sellers of product A, 6 as sellers of product B,
and the additional 6 as Buyer C. Each treatment contained 6 trading groups comprised of
only 1 product A seller, 1 product B seller and 1 Buyer. The experiments last for 20
rounds to mimic multiple production seasons, plus the trading groups are randomly
matched over all 20 trading rounds (and the 3 practice rounds). This is done to minimize
reputation, personal relationship effects and collusion.
The same general structure exists across all three treatments. In the experimental
market, just as in the theoretical model, the two input suppliers are Bertrand competitors.
Thus, in stage 1,they must make simultaneous pricing decisions within a specified range
of prices. The price ranges directly follow the extremes of the dominate buyer case.
In stage 2 of the experiment, the Buyer does not make an output decision but is
subject to the pricing decisions of the Sellers. As such, the Sellers face a perfectly
rational Buyer. While, it would have required fewer funds to conduct the experiment
without the buyer, the benefit of including the presence of the Buyer is to allow for a
behavioral effect from sellers. For instance, collusion among the sellers would
necessarily impact a person and not simply the experimenter. Thus, including the
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presence of a real (albeit fully rational) buyer simulates a more realistic behavioral
(market) setting.
Stage 2 then progresses with the payoff for each player being realized. The
profits of player A are a function of his own price and the price set by seller B, and the
Product B seller’s payoff is a function of his own price and the price of product B.
Finally, the Buyer who is subject to these prices realizes his payoff, which is function of
the prices of A and B (and quantity which is emended within the profit maximizing
computer generated choice).
Additionally, treatments two and three each introduce an alternative subsidy
policy. As such, each has an updated payoff table, and treatment three has an updated
pricing range to relay the change within the market. The section continues with a brief
summation of the three treatments.
Treatment 1 (Baseline Treatment): No Subsidy Policy (NS)
Treatment one is the baseline treatment and is conducted with no subsidy policy.
Here, I synthesize the instructions, with the full set of the instructions and payoff tables
are located in Appendix B.
In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C). Each trading period consists of two stages. These
stages (i.e. steps) are the same for every trading period. In stage 1 the input suppliers
make the pricing decisions. Thus, Seller A and Seller B both had to choose a price for
their respective product between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one hundredth increments (i.e.
1.92, 0.82, and 1.25), the price extremes for the dominate land buyer case. Note, in this
and the two remaining treatments, Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price while
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making pricing decisions and Seller B does not observe Seller A’s price while making
pricing decisions. Subjects were provided with a payoff table to refer to while making
pricing decisions (Table 1 in Appendix B). Notice in Table 1 that for any given price
combination, within each cell, the payoff Seller A receives is the top left number, the
payoff Seller B receives is the top right number and the payoff Buyer C would earn is the
bottom middle number. In stage two, payoffs were received by Seller A, Seller B and
Buyer C.
Treatment 2: Decoupled Payment System (FS)
The second treatment, the decoupled lump-sum payment, allows for a comparison
in the change of production decisions within the sector, against the baseline treatment.
In this section, I provide a very brief overview of the instructions. The full set of
instructions and payoff tables are provided in Appendix B.
Subjects were provided with a payoff table to refer to while making pricing
decisions (Table 2 in Appendix B). Notice in Table 2 that for any given price
combination, within each cell, the payoff Seller A receives is the top left number, the
payoff Seller B receives is the top right number and the payoff Buyer C would earn is the
bottom middle number. The product A and B sellers’ payoffs remain the same as in
table 1, however, from table 1 the buyer’s payoff has increased by 84 tokens.
Treatment 3 Coupled Input Subsidy (CS
The third is treatment designed to capture the changes in production decisions
resulting from the introduction of a coupled subsidy policy tied to the acres of land. In
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this section, I provide a very brief overview of the instructions. The full set of
instructions and payoff tables are provided in Appendix B.
In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C). In stage 1 the input suppliers make the pricing
decisions and must choose a price for their respective product between 0 and 2.51 tokens,
in one hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25), the price extremes for the
dominate land buyer case. Subjects were provided with a payoff table to refer to while
making pricing decisions (Table 3 in Appendix B). Notice in Table 3 that for any given
price combination, within each cell, the payoff Seller A receives is the top left number,
the payoff Seller B receives is the top right number and the payoff Buyer C would earn is
the bottom middle number. These are greater than the payoffs in treatment 1 for buyers
and sellers alike.
Computer Program: Z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic
Experiments)
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for
Readymade Economic Experiments) (Fischbacher, 2007), to make the experiment clearer
and more accessible for participants. A key benefit of Z-Tree is the experimenter’s
ability to link computers over a network allowing for easy generation and collection of
data.
For the stage 1 pricing decisions, each Seller viewed the following screen on their
computer when making pricing decisions (figure 31). Sellers A and B enter their price in
the box located in the middle of the computer screen. Once Sellers are confident with
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their pricing decisions, they submit their choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the
lower right hand corner of the computer screen.

Figure 31

Z-tree Pricing Decision Input Screen For Product A and Product B Sellers

While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer is presented with a
blank waiting screen. However, once both Sellers have input their pricing decisions,
Buyer C will ‘click’ the grey OK button, and the experiment continues to stage 2.
In stage 2 the payoffs of all three players in a trading group are provided. All
participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) viewed the following summary
screen on their computer (Figure 32). The trading round’s summary consists of the prices
chosen by both Sellers (A and B) and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller
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A, Seller B, and Buyer C). Each player’s own payoffs is denoted as “Your Profit” on the
summary screen. In addition, in addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of “Your
Profit” is displayed at the bottom of the screen.

Figure 32

Z-tree Trading Round Summary Screen For Product A and B Sellers and
Buyer C
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Conducting the Experiment
The Mississippi State University Institutional Review Board approved the
experimental study on subsidy incidence (IRB # 14-128) on April 14, 2014, for research
on using human subjects (See Appendix D).12
Subjects were recruited in person from the department of agricultural economics,
and by email from the departments of forestry, engineering, math and business. All
subjects were required to be at least a junior standing for undergraduates or of graduate
standing. The recruitment technique followed Davis and Holts’ (1993) suggested
protocol. All participants, whether it was by email or in person, were presented with the
same information, and language was generic as not to bias the results of the experiments
by detailing pertinent information. Because the experiment required exactly 18 people to
work, 18 subjects plus two to four alternatives were recruited for each session.
I will continue this section with a brief outline of the participation procedures
used to conduct the experiment. This will be followed by the payment procedures of the
sessions.
Laboratory Market Procedures
Upon arrival, subjects were asked to voluntarily sit at one of eighteen available
computers. At the computer terminal, subjects found the consent form, instructions, and
other materials needed to complete the experiment. Subjects were asked to read and, if
accepting the terms, sign the consent form. Once all consent forms had been signed and
collected by experimenters, the market experiment was ready to begin.

The IRB in appendix D incudes the IRB application, stamped informed consent, sample payments form,
and sample recruitment announcement.
12
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For the market experiment subjects were informed they would be participating in
a market in which they were randomly selected to act as a Buyer or Seller of products A
or B. The computer terminal choice made by the subject, determined the unique
identifier (i.e. 1A-6A, 1B-6B, and 1C-6C) assigned for the data collection program. The
experimenter read the instructions aloud and answered questions as necessary. Subjects
were then directed to their computer screens to participate in the three practice trading
rounds.
After completion of the practice rounds, subjects were then reminded that the
program will automatically transition to the 20 binding trading rounds, and calculate their
earnings for each round. At the completion of the market experiment, total earnings are
calculated for each subject (See Payment Procedure Section below for further detail).
Although not addressed in the scope of this thesis, subjects, upon completion of
the market experiment, were also asked to participate in a Holt and Laury (2002) risk
assessment game (See Appendix B). Subjects were instructed to locate and read along as
the experimenter reads the instructions aloud. Subjects were then instructed to open the
“Risk” tab in the provided Excel document. Once all subjects had made all 10-decision
row choices, the experimenter would let one of the subjects draw two balls. The first ball
determined the decision row (1-10), and the second the probability of a higher payoff (A
or B). Each participant recorded the first ball number, the second ball number, and then
their decision for that row (A or B), and their earned payoff on the risk record sheet.
Total earning were then calculated for each subject. After payments were made,
in the form of cash, the session was completed.

94

Payment Procedures
The earning of the subjects were based upon their earnings from the market
experiment and the risk experiment. In the market experiment, earnings were in the form
of tokens based upon the decisions made by each subject and those made by the others in
the group. At the end of the experiment, the number of tokens earned by each subject
was converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate. In the risk experiment, each
subject’s earnings depended only upon his choice and a series of random draws, and
possible earnings were in dollar increments. Thus, each subject’s total earnings for the
experiment were the summation of earnings from the market and risk experiment, plus a
$5.00 show-up fee.
The market experiment earning, denoted as tokens, were converted to dollars as
follow. The total number of trading rounds (20) was multiplied by the predicted
equilibrium profit for each player type per round, to find the predicted equilibrium of the
market experiment. The market experiment predicted earnings for each player type over
the three treatments are summarized in table 10.
Table 10

Predicted Equilibrium Total Market Earrings

Player Type
Product A Seller
Product B Seller
Product Buyer C

Treatment 1 (NSE)
1780.6
1780.6
894.8

Total Tokens
Treatment 2(FSE)
1780.6
1780.6
2574.8

Treatment 3 (CSE)
2799
2765.8
1400.8

It was estimated that the payoff from the market experiment earnings would be
approximately 20 dollars per subject if all players act in accordance to predicted
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equilibrium strategies. Thus, the total tokens in table 10 are used to develop conversion
rates for each player type per each treatment to equate experimental earnings. To do this
I divided the budgeted amount of 20 dollars by the total projected earnings. The resulting
conversion rates are presented in table 11.
Table 11

Tokens to Dollars Conversion Rates (Tokens to Dollars)

Player Type
Product A Seller
Product B Seller
Product Buyer C

Treatment 1 (NSE)
0.011232
0.011232
0.022351

Conversion Rates
Treatment 2(FSE)
0.011232
0.011232
0.007768

Treatment 3 (CSE)
0.007145
0.007231
0.014278

Thus, for experimental payment of the market experiment, each subject’s total
market earnings was multiplied by the conversion rate to determine his cash earnings.
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In testing the theoretical predictions against the experimental results, I find that
the prices and profits deviate from theory. Furthermore, on average, prices are greater
than the predicted theoretical values, thus the profits are on average less than the
predicted values. However, the treatment effect for prices and profits follow closely with
the predictions of theory. Importantly, neither of these results greatly influenced the
predicted welfare distributions, given the outcomes of the average pricing strategies
engaged by Sellers A and Sellers B.
First, the results of the hypotheses relating to the theoretical predictions of prices,
payoffs and welfare distributions for the NSE, FSE and CSE are reported. The statistical
test are reported first and then are followed by a graphical summary for all 20 trading
rounds. This will be followed by hypotheses concerning the differences of prices, profits
and welfare across the alternative subsidy polies (i.e. the treatment effect). Again, I
provide first the statistical test results which are then followed by a graphical summary
for all 20 trading rounds. This chapter concludes with a summary and overview of the
theoretical results across all three treatments.
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Results of Testing Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I report the results from prices, payoffs and welfare across all
three-subsidy policies using t-statistics and graphical analysis. The single sample t-test
method will be used to compare experimental sample mean of the variable with the
theoretical prediction.
Price Results
No Subsidy Price Results
Table 12 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the price of land and seed,
and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 33. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the price of land equaling 1.33 (predicted equilibrium price) is
smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean price of land is statistically different
from 1.33. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the price of land is
statistically greater than 1.33 at the same confidence level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value
for the price of seed equaling 1.33 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean
price of seed is statistically different from 1.33. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I
find that the price of seed is statistically greater than 1.33 at the same confidence level.
Although, the sample prices of land and seed are statistically greater than predicted from
theory, using the paired t-test I find that the mean difference between the price of land
and seed is not statistically different from zero. This result is in accordance to theoretical
predictions.
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Table 12

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Price For No Subsidy Policy
Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

120
1.5179
0.0216
Price of Land
0.0277
120
1.4548
Price of Seed
One Sample T- t-stat
Ho:
Pr (T<t)
test
Price of Land
8.6975
1.33
1.0000

0.2367

Variable

Price of Seed

Figure 33

Obs

4.5053

Mean

1.33

1.0000

0.3033
Pr(lTl>ltl )
0.0000
0.0000

Confidence Interval
(95%)
1.4751

1.5607

1.3999
1.5096
Pr (T>t) Accept or
Reject Ho
0.0000
Reject
0.0000

Reject

NS Price of Land and Price of Seed across 20 Trading Rounds vs The
Predicted NSE Prices.

Note: As seen in figure 33, experimental results differ from theory as theory did not
predict a deviation from the equilibrium prices over the 20 trading rounds.
Fixed Subsidy Policy Price Results
Table 13 reports the results of the one-sample t-test for the price of land and seed,
followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 34. The two-tailed t99

test’s p-value for the price of land equaling 1.33 (FSE) is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I
conclude that the mean price of land is statistically different from 1.33. Furthermore,
from the one-tailed t-test I find that the price of land is statistically greater than 1.33. The
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the price of seed equaling 1.33 is smaller than alpha=.05,
thus I conclude that the mean price of seed is statistically different from 1.33.
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the price of seed is statistically greater
than 1.33 at the same confidence level. As in the no subsidy results, the sample prices of
land and seed are statistically greater than predicted from theory. However, using the
paired t-test I find that the mean difference between the price of land and seed is
statistically different from zero. This result is not in accordance to theoretical
predictions.
Table 13

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Price for the Fixed Subsidy Policy

Variable
Price of Land

Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

120

1.496

0.0265

0.2902

Price of Seed
One Sample Ttest
Price of Land

120
t-stat

1.5352
Ho:

0.0259
Pr (T<t)

6.2651

1.33

1.0000

Price of Seed

7.9068

1.33

1.0000

100

Confidence Interval
(95%)
1.4435

1.5485

0.2842
1.4838
1.5865
Pr(lTl>ltl) Pr (T>t) Accept or
Reject Ho
0.0000
0.0000
Reject
0.0000

0.0000

Reject

Figure 34

FS Price of Land and Price of Seed Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The
Predicted FSE Prices.

Note: Figure 34 summarizes the high pricing strategies chosen by the input suppliers, and
a general movement away from the FSE price.
Coupled Subsidy Price Results
Table 14 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the price of land and seed,
and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 35. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the price of land equaling 1.66 (predicted CSE) is smaller than
alpha=.05. Additionally, using the one-tailed t-test I find that the price of land is
statistically greater than 1.66 at the same confidence level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value
for the price of seed equaling 1.66 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the
mean price of seed is statistically different from 1.66. Additionally, using the one-tailed
t-test I find that the price of seed is statistically greater than 1.66 at the same confidence
level. As in the two prior treatments, the sample prices of land and seed are statistically
greater than predicted from theory. Furthermore, using the paired t-test I find that the
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mean difference between the price of land and seed is statistically different from zero.
This result is not in accordance to theoretical predictions.
Table 14

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Price for the Coupled Subsidy
Policy

Variable

Obs

120
Price of Land
120
Price of Seed
One Sample T- t-stat
test
Price of Land
2.7012
Price of Seed

Figure 35

5.8590

Mean
1.7836

Standard
Error
0.0458

0.0361
1.8718
Ho:
Pr (T<t)
1.66

0.9960

1.66

1.0000

Standard
Deviation
0.5012

Confidence Interval
(95%)
1.6929
1.8742

0.3959
1.8002
1.9433
Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or
Reject Ho
0.0079
0.0040
Reject
0.0000

0.0000

Reject

CS Price of Land and Price of Seed Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The
Predicted CSE Prices

Note: Figure 35, shows the sporadic pricing of the land owner, and the general tendency
of the seed firm increasing prices over the 20 trading rounds.
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Profits (Payoffs) Results
No Subsidy Payoff Results
Table 15 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the payoff of land and seed,
and this is followed by a graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 36. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the landowner equaling 89.03 is smaller than
alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically different
from the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the
payoff earned by the landowner is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence
level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s profit equaling 89.03 is smaller
than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically
different from theory’s prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the
payoff earned by the seed supplier is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence
level. Using the paired t-test, I conclude that the mean difference between profit of the
landowner and seed firm is statistically different from zero, which is not in accordance to
theory. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the famer equaling 44.74 is
smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of the famer is statistically
different from the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that
the payoff earned by the farmer is statistically less than 44.74 at the same confidence
level.
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Table 15

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs for the No Subsidy Policy

Variable

Obs

Mean

Payoff to Land
Payoff to Seed
Payoff to Farmer
One Sample Ttest

120

75.293

Standard
Error
2.2258

120
120

70.3023
29.9357

1.7934
1.7882

19.6453
19.5892

66.7512
26.3948

Payoff Land

t-stat
-6.1763

Ho:
89.04

Payoff Seed

-10.4484

89.04

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

Payoff Farmer

-8.2787

44.74

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

Figure 36

Standard
Deviation
24.3823

Confidence Interval
(95%)
70.8857 79.7002

73.8533
33.4766
Accept or
Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Reject Ho
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
Reject

NS Sector Payoffs (Landowner, Seed Firm and Farmer)Across 20 Trading
Rounds vs The Predicted CSE Payoffs

Note: Figure 36 shows that average profits are below the equilibrium levels; this has a
direct correlation with the high pricing strategies in figure 33.
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Fixed Subsidy Payoff Results
Table 16 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the payoffs of the sector and
it is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 37. The two-tailed
t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the landowner equaling 89.03 is smaller than alpha=.05,
thus I conclude that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically different from the
theoretical predictions. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned
by the landowner is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence level. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s profit equaling 89.03 is smaller than alpha=.05,
thus I conclude that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically different from theory’s
prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by the seed
firm is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence level. Using the paired t-test I
conclude that the mean difference between profit of the landowner and seed firm is not
statistically different from zero, which is in accordance to theory. The two-tailed t-test’s
p-value for the payoff to the famer equaling 128.74 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I
conclude that the mean profit of the famer is statistically different from the theoretical
prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by the
farmer is statistically less than 128.74 at the same confidence level.
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Table 16

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs for the Fixed Subsidy
Policy
Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

120

68.058

2.1298

23.3305

63.8486

72.2829

Payoff to Seed

120

70.1051

2.1895

23.9845

65.7697

74.4405

Payoff to Farmer

120

111.7979

1.9787

21.6757

107.88

115.716

t-stat

Ho:

Pr (T<t)

Pr( lTl > ltl )

Pr (T>t)

Accept or
Reject Ho

Payoff Land

-9.8481

89.04

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

Payoff Seed

-8.6481

89.04

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

-33.8897

128.74

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Variable
Payoff to Land

One Sample T-test

Payoff Farmer

Figure 37

Confidence Interval
(95%)

Reject

FS Sector Payoffs (Landowner, Seed Firm and Farmer)Across 20 Trading
Rounds vs The Predicted FSE Payoffs

Note: Again profits are lower than predictions due to the high pricing strategies of input
suppliers.
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Coupled Subsidy Payoff Results
Table 17 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the price of land and seed,
and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 38. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the landowner equaling 139.89 is smaller than
alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically different from
the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff
earned by the landowner is statistically less than 139.79 at the same confidence level.
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s profit equaling 138.02 is smaller than
alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically different from
theory’s prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by
the seed firm is statistically less than 138.02 at the same confidence level. Using the
paired t-test I conclude that the mean difference between profit of the landowner and seed
firm is not statistically different from zero (although not strongly as p-value is 0.07),
which is in accordance to theory. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the
famer equaling 70.69 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of
the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a
one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by the landowner is statistically less than
70.69 at the same confidence level.
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Table 17

Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Coupled Subsidy Payoffs

Variable
Payoff to Land
Payoff to Seed
Payoff to
Farmer
One Sample
T-test

Obs

Mean

120

108.6973

120

118.3319

120

54.7054

Standard
Error
3.7364

Standard
Deviation
40.9302

4.5771

50.1397

4.1681

45.6589

Confidence
Interval (95%)
101.298 116.057
8
109.268 127.395
8
46.4523 62.9587

Pr
(T>t)
1.0000

Accept
or
Reject
Ho
Reject

Payoff Land

t-stat
-8.3483

Ho:
139.89

Pr (T<t)
0.0000

Pr( lTl >
ltl )
0.0000

Payoff Seed

-4.5199

89.04

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

Payoff Farmer

-3.8350

70.69

0.0001

0.0002

0.9999

Reject

Figure 38

CS Sector Payoffs (Landowner, Seed Firm and Farmer)Across 20 Trading
Rounds vs The Predicted CSE Payoffs

Note: The sporadic payoffs in the CS treatment are due to the large changes in the
landowners pricing strategies over the 20 trading round. As seen in figure 38 the seed
firm and famer benefit from the landowner at times pricing below the optimal CSE price.
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Welfare Distribution Results
No Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results
Table 18 reports the results of one-sample test for the sector in regards to percent
of sector surplus when no subsidy is present. The table is followed by the graphical
summary of sector surplus distribution across all 20 rounds in figure 39. The two-tailed
t-test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus equaling 0.40, or forty
percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I determine that the mean percent of sector
surplus held by the landowner is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by the landowner is
statistically greater than forty percent of the total sector surplus at the same confidence
level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s percent of sector surplus
equaling 0.40, or forty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I determine that the mean
percent of sector surplus held by the seed firm is statistically different from the
theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by
the seed firm is statistically greater than forty percent of the total sector surplus at the
same confidence level, as was the same case for the landowner. Thus, the test leads to
rejection of the theoretical hypothesis since both the landowner and seed firm, through
setting higher prices, retain a greater share of the sector surplus. However, it is important
to note that this increase in share over the hypothesized value does not imply a greater
surplus as the landowner and seed firms both realized reduced profits from their high
pricing strategy.
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus equaling
0.20, or twenty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean percent
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of sector surplus held by the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by the landowner is
statistically less than twenty percent of the total sector surplus at the same confidence
level. This leads to rejection of the theoretical prediction; however, it follows with
theory, as theory predicts a reduction in the farmer’s retention of sector surplus when the
input suppliers implement a high pricing strategy.
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Table 18

Summary Statistics and T-test Results for No Subsidy Welfare Distributions

Variable
Percent of
Sector
Surplus: Land
Percent of
Sector
Surplus: Seed
Percent of
Sector
Surplus:
Farmer
One Sample
T-test
Percent of
Sector
Surplus: Land
Percent of
Sector
Surplus: Seed
Percent of
Sector
Surplus:
Farmer

Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

Confidence
Interval (95%)

120

0.4344

0.0051

0.0558

0.4243

0.4445

120

0.4148

0.00643

0.0705

0.4021

0.4276

120

0.1508

0.0057

0.0624

0.1395

0.1621

Pr
(T>t)

Accept
or
Reject
Ho

t-stat

Ho:

Pr (T<t)

Pr( lTl >
ltl )

6.67459

0.4

1.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Reject

2.3033

0.4

0.9885

0.0230

0.0115

Reject

-8.6398

0.2

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject
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Figure 39

NSE Sector Welfare Distributions (Landowner, Seed Firm and
Farmer)Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The Predicted NSE Sector Welfare
Distributions

Fixed Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results
Table 19 reports the results of one-sample test for the sector in regards to percent
of sector surplus when a fixed subsidy of 84 tokens is paid to the farmer. This is
followed by the graphical summary of sector surplus distribution across all 20 rounds in
figure 40. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus
equaling 0.29, or twenty-nine percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean
percent of sector surplus held by the landowner is statistically different from the
theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held
by the landowner is statistically smaller than twenty-nine percent of the total sector
surplus at the same confidence level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s
percent of sector surplus equaling 0.29, or twenty-nine percent, is smaller than alpha=.05,
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thus I conclude that the mean percent of sector surplus held by the seed firm is
statistically different from the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed ttest I find that the surplus held by the seed firm, like the landowner, is statistically less
than twenty-nine percent of the total sector surplus at the same confidence level. Thus,
the test lead to rejection of the theoretical hypothesis since both the landowner and seed
firm, through setting higher prices obtain a smaller share of the sector surplus, when a fix
subsidy is paid to the farmer.
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus equaling
0.42 or forty-two percent is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean percent of
sector surplus held by the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by the famer is
statistically greater than forty-two percent of the total sector surplus at the same
confidence level. This leads to rejection of the theoretical predictions of the sectors
surplus distribution hypothesis in the presence of a fixed subsidy.
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Table 19

Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Fixed Subsidy Welfare
Distributions

Variable
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Land
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Seed
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Farmer
One Sample Ttest
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Land
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Seed
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Farmer

Obs

Mean

120

0.2666

120

0.2743

120

0.4590

Standard
Error
0.0045

Standard
Deviation
0.0491

Confidence
Interval (95%)
0.2578
0.2756

0.0047

0.0517

0.2650

0.2837

0.0062

0.0679

0.4468

0.4713

Pr
(T>t)

Accept
or
Reject
Ho

t-stat

Ho:

Pr (T<t)

Pr( lTl >
ltl )

-5.2352

0.2901

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

-3.3422

0.2901

0.0006

0.0011

0.9994

Reject

5.8293

.4229

1.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Reject
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Figure 40

FSE Sector Welfare Distributions (Landowner, Seed Firm and
Farmer)Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The Predicted FSE Sector Welfare
Distributions

Coupled Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results
Table 21 reports the results of one-sample test for the sector in regards to percent
of sector surplus and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure
41. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus equaling
0.40 or, forty percent, is greater than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean percent of
sector surplus held by the landowner is not statistically different from the theoretical
prediction. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s percent of sector surplus
equaling 0.40, or forty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean
percent of sector surplus held by the seed firm is statistically different from the
theoretical prediction. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the seed firm’s
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percent of sector surplus is statistically greater than forty percent at the same confidence
level. Thus, the tests lead to rejection of the theoretical hypothesis for the seed firm,
which is a result of the seed firm employing a higher pricing strategy than the landowner
does, on average; because pricing strategies thus prices determine the profits and
therefore perfect of sector surplus retention.
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus equaling
0.20, or twenty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I observe that the mean percent of
sector surplus held by the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus held by
the famer is statistically less than twenty percent, at the same confidence level. This
leads to rejection of the theoretical prediction, however, follows with theory as the model
predicts a reduction in the farmer’s retention of sector surplus when the input suppliers
engage in a high pricing strategy.
Thus, the experimental results lead to rejection of two theoretical predictions, as
when a coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market the
percent of sector surplus retained by the famer and seed firm were statically different
from the predicted values due to the landowner and seed firm both pricing over the
predicted equilibrium prices. However, because the seed firm engaged on average in a
higher pricing strategy than the landowner, he was able to extract more of the sector
surplus, which resulted in the landowners share of sector surplus not being statistically
different from the predicted value.
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Table 20

Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Fixed Subsidy Welfare
Distributions Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Coupled Subsidy
Payoffs

Variable
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Land
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Seed
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Farmer

Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

120

0.4086

0.0093

0.1016

0.3903

0.427

120

0.4295

0.0071

0.0782

0.4154

0.4436

120

0.1619

0.0078

0.0853

0.1465

0.1773

One Sample Ttest
t-stat
Percent of
Sector Surplus: 0.9299
Land
Percent of
Sector Surplus: 4.5547
Seed
Percent of
Sector Surplus: -4.8929
Farmer

Confidence
Interval (95%)

Ho:

Pr (T<t)

Pr( lTl >
ltl )

Pr
(T>t)

Accept
or
Reject
Ho

0.41

0.8228

0.3543

0.1772

Accept

0.40

1.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Reject

0.20

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject
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Figure 41

CSE Sector Welfare Distributions (Landowner, Seed Firm and
Farmer)Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The Predicted CSE Sector Welfare
Distributions

Results of Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices
To ensure the correct t-test statistic is calculated, the assumption of equal variance
must be tested. Bartlett’s chi-squared test static is used to accept or reject the null of
equal variance at 99 percent confidence level. Rejection of the null indicates a violation
of the assumption. Accordingly, an adjusted t-statistic using the individual sample
standards deviations versus the pooled standard deviation will be found using the Welch
procedure (1974).
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Price Results
No Subsidy vs Fixed Subsidy Price Results
Table 21 reports the results of two-sample test for the price of land and seed, and
is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 42. The price of land
does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 2 (FS), thus the
alterative Welch’s t-statistic are reported. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the mean
price of land having no difference across treatment 1 and 2 is larger than alpha=.05, thus
accepting the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly different
from zero. Thus, I conclude that the mean price of land in the fixed subsidy case does not
differ from the no subsidy case, as predicted from theory.
The price of seed has equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 2
(FS); therefore, I report the standard t-statistic. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the
price of seed having no difference across treatment 1 and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05,
thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly
different from zero. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean price of
land is statistically greater than in the fixed subsidy than the mean price of seed in the no
subsidy case. This is a result not predicted from theory.
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Table 21

Variable

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Prices in the No Subsidy vs. Fixed
Subsidy Policy
Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Price of Land
1.507
0.0171
Combine 240
+
0.0219
0.0342
Difference
Price of Seed
1.495
0.0191
Combine 240
+
-0.0804
0.0379
Difference
One Sample T- t-stat
Ho:
Pr (T<t)
test
Price of Land
0.6410* Diff=0
0.7389
Price of Seed
-2.1191 Diff=0
0.0176

Standard
Deviation
0.2645

Confidence Interval
(95%)
1.4733
-0.0454

1.5406
0.08928

0.2961

1.4573
1.5326
-0.1552 -0.0057
Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or
Reject Ho
0.5221
0.2611
Accept
0.0351

0.9824

Reject

Note:+difference refers to the difference between the mean price in treatment 1 minus
mean price in treatment 2 and * indicates use of welch t-stat

Figure 42

Treatment Effect on Land and Seed Prices Across 20 Trading Rounds
Comparing NS and FS
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No Subsidy vs Coupled Subsidy Price Results
Table 22 reports the results of two-sample t-test for the price of land and price of
seed, and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 43. The
price of land does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 3 (CS),
thus the alternative Welch’s t-statistic will be used. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the
price of land having no difference across treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05,
thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly
different from zero. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean price of
land with the addition of the coupled subsidy is statistically greater than the mean price
without the coupled subsidy. Thus, the coupled subsidy will on average increase the
price of land, all else constant; this is a result that is predicted by theory.
The price of seed does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and
treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be used. The two-tailed ttest’s p-value for the price of seed having no difference across treatment 1 and 3 is
smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not
statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find
that the mean price of seed with the addition of the coupled subsidy policy is statistically
greater than the mean price of seed with no subsidy policy, at the same confidence level.
Thus, a coupled subsidy will, on average, increase the price of seed, all else constant; this
is a result predicted from theory.
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Table 22

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Prices in the No Subsidy vs.
Coupled Subsidy Policy

Variable

Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

Confidence Interval
(95%)

Price of Land
0.02667
1.6508
Combine 240
+
0.0506
-0.2657
Difference
Price of Seed
0.0264
1.663
Combine 240
+
0.0455
-0.417
Difference
One Sample T- t-stat
Ho:
Pr (T<t)
test
Price of Land
-5.2506* Diff=0 0.0000

1.6112
1.7153
-0.5067 -0.3273
Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or
Reject Ho
0.0000
1.0000
Reject

Price of Seed

0.0000

-9.1590* Diff=0

0.000

0.4131

1.5982
-0.3655

1.7034
-0.1658

0.4093

1.0000

Reject

Note: +difference refers to the difference between the mean price in treatment 1 minus
mean price in treatment 3 and * indicates use of welch t-stat

Figure 43

Treatment Effect on Land and Seed Prices Across 20 Trading Rounds
Comparing NS and CS
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Profits (Payoffs) Results
No Subsidy VS. Fixed Subsidy Payoff Results
Table 23 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the
landowner and seed firm and the farmer. It is followed by a graphical summary across all
20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 44 and for the farmer in figure 45.
The payoff to the landowner does have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS)
and treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported. The two-tailed t-test’s
p-value for the payoff earned by the landowner, having no difference across treatment 1
and 2, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not
statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find
that the mean earning of the landowner in the fixed subsidy case is statistically less than
the mean earnings from the no subsidy case, at the same confidence level. However, this
finding is the result of the spillover effect induced from the seed firms, on average
employing a higher pricing strategy in treatment 2. Thus, this result is not predicted by
theory.
The payoff to the seed firm does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS)
and treatment 2 (FS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the seed firm, having no difference across
treatment 1 and 2, is greater than alpha=.05, thus accepting the null that the difference in
means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a onetailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the seed firm in the fixed subsidy case is
neither statistically greater than nor less than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.
This finding is interesting since the mean price chosen by the seed firm was higher in
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treatment 2; however, on average it did not statistically alter the mean payoffs earned.
This result is due to the slight change in the average pricing strategy of the landowner.
The payoff to the farmer has equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and
treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported. The two-tailed t-test’s pvalue for the payoff earned by the farmer, firm having no difference across treatment 1
and 2, is greater than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not
statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find
that the mean earning of the farmer in the fixed subsidy case is statistically greater than
the mean earnings from the no subsidy case. This is a result that was predicted from
theory.
The addition of the fixed payment was not theoretically predicted to alter the
payoffs to the input suppliers; however, the results indicate the landowners mean NSE
profits where greater than the mean FSE profits. Just as the theoretical predictions
suggest, the fixed lump sum payment of 84 tokens statistically increased farmer profits in
relation to a market with no subsidy, although still falling short of the theoretical
prediction of the profit.

124

Table 23

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs in the No Subsidy vs.
Fixed Subsidy Policy

Variable

Obs

Payoff of Land
240
Combine
+
Difference
Payoff of Seed
240
Combine
+
Difference
Payoff of
Farmer
240
Combine
Difference+
One Sample T- t-stat
test

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

71.6794
7.2271

1.5547
3.0806

24.086

68.6166
1.1584

74.7421
13.2959

70.2037
0.1972

1.4121
2.8302

21.8769

67.4218
-5.3791

72.9855
5.7735

70.8668
2.9632
-81.862#
2.6670
Ho:
Pr (T<t)

45.9060

65.0294
-87.1162
Pr (T>t)

76.7042
-76.6082
Accept
or
Reject
Ho
Reject

Payoff of Land

Pr( lTl >
ltl )

Confidence Interval
(95%)

2.3460
Diff=0
0.9901
0.0198
0.0099
Payoff of Seed
Diff=0
0.5277
0.9445
0.4723
Accept
0.0697*
Payoff of
Differ=
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
Reject
Farmer
30.6941
0
Notes: +difference refers to the difference between the mean payoffs in treatment 1 minus
mean payoff in treatment 2. #This is the difference of the mean payoff in treatment 1 and
treatment 2, thus creating a discrepancy between the 84 paid by the subsidy and the
81.8622 difference between the means and * indicates use of welch t-stat
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Figure 44

Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds
Comparing NS and FS

Figure 45

Treatment Effect on Farmer Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds Comparing
NS and FS
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No Subsidy VS Coupled Subsidy Payoff Results
Table 24 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the
landowner and seed firm and the farmer. It is followed by the graphical summary across
all 20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 46 and for the farmer in figure 47.
The payoff to the landowner does not have equal variances across treatment 1
(NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported. The
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the landowner having no difference
across treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the
difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore,
from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the landowner in the coupled
subsidy case is statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case, at
the same confidence level. This is a result that was predicted by theory
The payoff to the seed firm does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS)
and treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the seed firm having no difference across
treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in
means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a onetailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the seed firm in the coupled subsidy case is
statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case, at the same
confidence level. This result is predicted from theory.
The payoff to the farmer does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS)
and treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported. The twotailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the famer having no difference across
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treatment 1 and 3 is less than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in
means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a onetailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the farmer, with the addition of the coupled
subsidy is statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.
The results are in accordance to theoretical predictions, as the coupled subsidy of
one token tied to the quantity choice of land, raised the mean profits earned by the input
suppliers; as the mean profits are statistically greater than the means in the no subsidy
from treatment 1. Likewise, the subsidy also increased the mean profit of the farmer
because the mean coupled subsidy profit from treatment 3 is increased over the no
subsidy profits realized in treatment 1. However, a result not predicted from theory is the
difference between the payoffs of the landowner and the seed firm. The two-tailed t-test
for the mean difference of the differences between profit of the landowner and seed firm
across treatments 1 and 3 is statistically different from zero as the p-value of 0.0325 leads
to rejection of the null. Thus, the coupled subsidy, on average, increased the profits (i.e.
increased the difference over the no subsidy case) for the seed firm more so than for the
landowner. In all, the experimental results on average indicate that the addition of the
coupled input subsidy will statistically increase the profits of the entire sector if the inputs
are nearly perfect complements, as theoretically predicted.
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Table 24

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs in the No Subsidy vs.
Coupled Subsidy Policy

Variable

Obs

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

Confidence Interval
(95%)

Payoff of Land
2.2258
91.9951
Combine 240
+
4.3491
-33.4043
Difference
Payoff of Seed
2.9033
94.3171
Combine 240
+
4.9159
-48.0296
Difference
Payoff of Farmer
2.4006
42.3206
Combine 240
+
4.5355
-24.7697
Difference
One Sample T- t-stat
Ho:
Pr (T<t)
test
Payoff of Land -7.6807* Diff=0
0.0000

37.5916 47.0496
-33.726 -15.8135
Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or
Reject Ho
0.0000
1.0000
Reject

Payoff of Seed

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

Payoff of Farmer -5.4613* Differ=0 0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Reject

-9.7703* Diff=0

24.3823

70.8857
-41.9816

79.7002
-24.827

44.9780

88.5978 100.0364
-57.7403 -38.319

37.19

Notes: +difference refers to the difference between the mean payoffs in treatment 1
minus mean payoff in treatment 3 and * indicates use of welch t-stat

Figure 46

Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds
Comparing NS and CS
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Figure 47

Treatment Effect on Farmer Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds Comparing
NS and CS

Welfare Distribution Results
No Subsidy Vs Fixed Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results
Table 25 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the
landowner and seed firm and the farmer. It is followed by the graphical summary across
all 20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 48 and for the farmer in figure 49.
The landowner’s percent of sector surplus has equal variances across treatment 1
(NS) and treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported. The two-tailed ttest’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus having no difference across
treatment 1 and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in
means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a onetailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the landowner in the
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fixed subsidy case is statistically less than the mean percent of sector surplus from the no
subsidy case. This is a result predicted by theory.
The seed firm’s percent of sector surplus does not have equal variances across
treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 2 (FS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be
reported. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s percent of sector surplus
having no difference across treatment 1 and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting
the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus
retained by the seed firm in the fixed subsidy case is statistically less than the mean
percentage of sector surplus earned by the seed firm in the no subsidy case. This is a
result predicted by theory.
The famer’s percent of sector surplus has equal variances across treatment 1 (NS)
and treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported. The two-tailed t-test’s
p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus having no difference across treatment 1
and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not
statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find
that the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the famer in the fixed subsidy case is
statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case. This is a result
predicted from theory.
In accordance to theoretical predictions, the fixed subsidy of 84 token increased
the farmer’s percent of total available sector surplus while decreasing the input supplier’s
share. In all, the experimental results conclude that the addition of a fixed subsidy will
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statistically alter the distribution of sector surplus as predicted by theory, thus confirming
the some degree of seperability of the fixed payment.
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Table 25

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Welfare Distributions in the No
Subsidy vs. Fixed Subsidy Policy

Variable
Obs
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Landowner
240
Combine
+
Difference
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Seed
240
Combine
+
Difference
Percent of
Sector Surplus:
Farmer
240
Combine
+
Difference
One Sample T- t-stat
test

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

0.3505
0.1677

0.0064
0.0068

0.0991

0.3379
0.1543

0.3631
0.1811

0.3446
0.1405

0.0060
0.008

0.0936

0.3327
0.1248

0.3565
0.1562

0.0108
0.3049
0.0084
-0.3082
Ho:
Pr (T<t)

0.1676

0.2836
-0.3248
Pr
(T>t)

0.3262
-0.2916
Accept
or
Reject
Ho
Reject

Pr( lTl >
ltl )

Confidence
Interval (95%)

Percent of
24.718
Diff=0 1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Sector Surplus:
Landowner
Percent of
17.612* Diff=0 1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject
Sector Surplus:
Seed
Percent of
-36.625 Diff=0 0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
Reject
Sector Surplus:
Farmer
Notes: +difference refers to the difference between the mean percent of sector surplus in
treatment 1 minus mean in treatment 2 and * indicates use of welch t-stat
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Figure 48

Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Welfare Distributions Across 20
Trading Rounds Comparing NS and FS

Figure 49

Treatment Effect on Farmer Welfare Distributions Across 20 Trading
Rounds Comparing NS and FS
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Welfare Results Three and Four
Table 26 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the
landowner and seed firm and the farmer. It is followed by the graphical summary across
all 20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 50 and for the farmer in figure 51.
The landowner’s percent of sector surplus does not have equal variances across
treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the adjusted Welch’s t-statistic will be
reported. The p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus having no difference
across treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the
difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore,
from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the
landowner in the presence of a coupled input subsidy is statistically greater than the mean
in the no subsidy case.
The seed firm’s percent of sector surplus does have equal variances across
treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported. The
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s percent of sector surplus having no
difference across treatment 1 and 3 is greater than alpha=.05, thus accepting the null that
the difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore,
from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus retained by the seed
firm does not change with the addition of the coupled subsidy.
The famer’s percent of sector surplus does not have variances across treatment 1
(NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the adjusted Welch’s t-statistic will be reported. The
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus having no difference
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across treatment 1 and 3 is greater than alpha=.05, thus accepting the null that the
difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero. Thus, I find that
the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the famer in the coupled subsidy case is
neither statistically greater nor less than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.
Thus, in accordance to theoretical predictions, the coupled subsidy of one token
tied to the quantity choice of land did not alter the surplus distributions of the seed firm
or the farmer, as there is no statistical difference in the NS results and the CS results.
However, the landowner’s percent of sector surplus on average was not equal across
treatments as predicted by theory.
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Table 26

Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Welfare Distributions in the No
Subsidy vs. Coupled Subsidy Policy

Variable
Obs
Percent of Sector
Surplus:
Landowner
240
Combine
+
Difference
Percent of Sector
Surplus: Seed
240
Combine
+
Difference
Percent of Sector
Surplus: Farmer
240
Combine
+
Difference
One Sample Tt-stat
test

Mean

Standard
Error

Standard
Deviation

0.4215
0.026

0.0053
0.0106

0.0828

0.411
0.0049

0.4320
0.0466

0.4222
-0.015

0.0048
0.0096

0.0746

0.4127
-0.0336

0.4316
0.0042

0.1563
0.0048
-0.0111
0.0096
Ho:
Pr (T<t)

0.0748

0.1468
0.1659
-0.0301
0.008
Pr
Accept
(T>t)
or
Reject
Ho

Pr( lTl >
ltl )

Confidence
Interval (95%)

Percent of Sector
Surplus:
2.433* Diff=0
0.9920
0.0159
0.0080
Reject
Landowner
Percent of Sector
-1.528 Diff=0
0.0639
0.1279
0.9361
Accept
Surplus: Seed
Percent of Sector
-1.148* Diff=0
0.1264
0.2528
0.8736
Accept
Surplus: Farmer
Note: +difference refers to the difference between the mean percent of sector surplus in
treatment 1 minus mean in treatment 3 and * indicates use of welch t-stat
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Figure 50

Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Welfare Distributions Across 20
Trading Rounds Comparing NS and CS
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Figure 51

Treatment Effect on Farmer Welfare Distributions Across 20 Trading
Rounds Comparing NS and CS

Summary of Experimental Results
To address the central issue of the farmers’ ability to retain subsidy dollars, I
utilize the mean prices, payoffs and welfare distributions across the subsidy treatments to
identify the factors contributing to the farmers’ non-retention of subsidy dollars and to
note what degree the non-retained subsidy dollars distort market outcomes. I finally
address the subsidy incidence in terms of the percentage of profits.
Overall, it is clear that, the fixed payment mechanism creates fewer market
distortions (See tables 21, 22, 23 and 24). First, as seen in the price results, the price of
land decreases by only 0.02 tokens and the price of seed increases by 0.08 tokens from
the no subsidy to fixed subsidy treatments. Whereas, in treatment three the price of land
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increases by 0.27 tokens and the price of seed increases by 0.42 tokens, over the no
subsidy treatment.
Figure 52 outlines the variation in profits for the landowner, seed firm and famer
for the decoupled and the coupled subsidy treatments. The graph shows that the mean
total sector surplus for the fixed subsidy is 250 tokens, whereas the mean sector surplus
in the coupled subsidy treatment is 282. Thus, the mean payment of 67.507 due to the
multiplier effect has a greater (positive) impact on the sector than the 84 dollar fixed
payment from treatment 2. Thus, treatment three has a higher return on the subsidy
payment, with regards to the total sector surplus than the fixed payment system.
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Figure 52

Profits Across the Fixed Subsidy Vs the Coupled Subsidy Policies in
Comparison to Subsidy Payments

However, as shown in figure 53 the change in the famer’s profit is significantly
less in the coupled subsidy than in the fixed subsidy payment mechanism. The results
find that the farmer only gains, on average, 24.76 of the average coupled subsidy
payment of 67.506. Furthermore, the seed supplier gains the largest increase in profits
from the coupled subsidy, as the firm benefits from an average of 48.02 additional tokens
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under a coupled subsidy. Surprisingly, the landowner does not fare as well as the seed
supplier as the landowner only accrues an additional 33.0404 tokens on average.

Figure 53

Percent Increases in Sector Profits In the Coupled Subsidy VS No Subsidy
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH

Summary and Conclusions
The recent introduction of the Agricultural Act of 2014 dramatically changed the
payment mechanism for farm subsidy payments. However, the central issues remain the
same—the farmers’ ability to retain subsidy dollars. Although, in the partial equilibrium
model I cannot measure the subsidy retained by the farmer, I use the percent of sector
welfare retention as a proxy. Comparing welfare distributions takes out the price and
quantity effects, thus allowing me to compare across alterative police. Thus, it is
important to identify the factors contributing to the farmers’ non-retention of subsidy
dollars and to what degree the non-retained subsidy dollars distort market outcomes.
Summary
Empirical research has found that farm subsidies are heavily chaptalized into land
rental rates (Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992; Just and Miranowski, 1993;and Schmitz,
Just, and Moss, 2003). However, the literature suggest disparities in the market power
assumption as having an influence on the farmers ability to retain subsidy dollars
(Saitone, Sexton and Sexton, 2008 and Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, 2011). The method
I use to analyze subsidy incidence accounts for the market power of the input suppliers in
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the agriculture sector. Accordingly, since farmers are price takers for some inputs, I
specify Bertrand competition for the model to address the market power in a
heterogonous input market. This specification is fundamental as Fulton and Giannakas
(2001) suggest market power as having adverse distributional impacts that are relevant
for public policy consideration, and Myers, Sexton and Tomek (2010) indicate that the
perfect competition assumption will lead to misleading results when an oligopoly,
oligopsony or both characterize the true institution.
The two upstream Bertrand competitors represented in the model are selling
complementary goods (i.e. factors of production), thus the seed manufacture competes
with a landowner in setting prices. The Bowley model was utilized due to the breakdown
(i.e. pricing at marginal cost, for further detail see appendix A) of the CES model and
more importantly it has been used extensively in modeling differentiated product in
Bertrand and Cournot competition (e.g. Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984; Häckner
2000; Symeonidis, 2002). Using the Bowley functional form to model two differentiated
input suppliers is unique with regards to the subsidy incidence, as the literature to date
has ignored the impact(s) of horizontal competition in the upstream market. However,
modeling of non-substitutable (complementary) inputs exhibit unique characteristics and
generate spillover effects (externality) within a sector. Specifically, in price competition,
increasing the price of one input negatively influences profits to the sellers of the
complement inputs. This cross-price effect generates a prisoner’s dilemma game for the
two suppliers of the complementary inputs.
Thus, the main contributions to the subsidy incidence literature is the
acknowledgement of a competitive environment in which i) factors of production in
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agriculture are largely complementary, and ii) input suppliers in technically separate
markets are able to compete for the extraction of the subsidy dollars paid to the farmer.
More specifically, through the theoretical and experimental method I was able to identify
the impacts of the competitive relationships, input substitutability, and alterative subsidy
policies.
The theoretical derived results, for the coupled and fixed subsidy are consistent
with past research, in regards to the treatment effects. For the fixed subsidy only the
payoff to the farmer increases, thus the result is a change in the welfare distributions of
the sector. However, under a coupled policy theoretical input prices, input quantities, and
profits are increased in the sector, but results in no change for the welfare distributions.
The fixed subsidy increases the available sector surplus. The distribution and effect of
decoupled payments rest upon the fact that the fixed subsidy solely improves the farmer's
sector surplus, under the assumption that G (the fixed direct payment) is a separable
influence on the farmer's decision. Thus, it does not distort production decisions (i.e.
input market prices and quantities).
Unlike the fixed subsidy, the coupled subsidy policy, in theory results in a higher
input price for the affiliated factor, hence it is one of the contributing factors to the
subsidy incidence. However, the non-affiliated input markets (seed) capture the subsidy
dollar to a lesser degree as technical substitution of inputs rises although the subsidy
incidence applies to all inputs. Otherwise stated, for every dollar the farmer receives
from a coupled subsidy payment, the landowner and seed manufacture are
simultaneously, through higher prices (stage 1 reaction function) and an increase in factor
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quantities (stage 2 reaction function), able to extract a portion of the increase in available
sector surplus.
To gain insight into the welfare distribution impacts of the fixed and coupled
subsidy, I use the farmer’s and input providers’ surplus in equilibrium as a percentage of
surplus available in the market (as a given, market is in equilibrium). The famer realizes
the greatest improvement in surplus share under the fixed subsidy policy, more so as
inputs become closer substitutes. Interestingly, though the farmer’s profits increase
under a coupled subsidy policy, the improvement in surplus distribution is modest in
relation to no-subsidy policy. Overall, the improvement in the farmer’s surplus
distribution is driven by the technical relationship of the inputs and the Bertrand
competition as the coupled subsidy does not alter the distribution.
The distribution of total sector surplus for the input suppliers differs across the
various subsidy policies. For all policies, the landowner and seed firm have nearly
symmetric surplus shares when the inputs are nearly perfect complements. Under a fixed
subsidy policy, input supplier surplus shares are symmetrically lower than the market
with no-subsidy. However, under the coupled subsidy policy, the affiliated (nonaffiliated) input supplier’s surplus distribution is greater (less) than both the no and fixed
subsidy policy. However, as the inputs approach nearly perfect complements, the
coupled subsidy results in nearly symmetric surplus shares; this result is driven by the
Bertrand competition between the input suppliers.
However, not all of the theoretical predictions and relationships held in the
development laboratory markets. These results were key to providing empirical results
for the model and testing of the theoretical predictions. The controlled environment, set
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up in the experimental market, allowed for isolation of factors that induced a change in
subject behavior, and therefore market outcomes. The experimental setting was
necessary to understand to what extent the alternative subsidy payment mechanisms
modify the strategic interactions in the sector and therefore the distribution of surplus
across the sector. The experiment consisted of three treatments; each treatment was a
three-player game involving two input providers and a buyer. I started with a summary
of the landowner’s actions and results across the three treatments, then summarize the
seed firm’s actions and results, and finally discuss the famers results across the three
treatments.
In the no subsidy case, the observed price of land was greater than the predicted
value of 1.33. Accordingly, it follows that the t-test for the landowner’s profit in the nosubsidy treatment indicates that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically less than
the theoretical prediction of 89.03. However, the treatment effect across the no subsidy
treatment and fixed subsidy treatment are in accordance to theory’s predictions since the
mean price of land in the fixed subsidy case do not differ from mean in the no-subsidy
case. Thus, the observed price of land is also above the predicted value of 1.33 for the
fixed subsidy payment policy. Intuitively, it follows that the mean profit of the
landowner is statistically less than the theoretical prediction of 89.03 for the fixed subsidy
policy. For the coupled subsidy, the observed price of land is also statistically greater
than the predicted value. Thus, the observed price of land is greater than theoretical
prediction of 1.66 tokens. Although, to some degree counter-intuitive, the landowner
would benefit by coordinating and setting prices below that of the Bertrand equilibriums
(Dari-Matticacci and Parisi, 2006). Additionally, in accordance to theory’s prediction,
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the mean price of land with the coupled subsidy is statistically greater than the mean
price without the coupled subsidy and I conclude that on average the coupled input
subsidy will increase the price of land, all else constant. From the pricing results of the
landowner, it makes since that I was able to conclude that the mean profit of the
landowner is statistically less than 139.89, the theoretical prediction in the presence of the
coupled subsidy, but it is greater than mean profit of the landowner in the presence of no
subsidy.
In the no subsidy case, the observed price of seed was greater than the predicted
value of 1.33. Accordingly, it follows that the t-test for the landowner’s profit in the nosubsidy treatment indicates that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically less than
the theoretical prediction of 89.03. However, unlike the price of land the treatment effect
across the no subsidy treatment and fixed subsidy treatment does not follow in
accordance to theory’s predictions since the mean price of seed in the fixed subsidy case
differs (greater) from mean in the no-subsidy case. Thus, the observed price of seed is
also above the predicted value of 1.33 for the fixed subsidy payment policy. Intuitively,
it follows that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically less than the theoretical
prediction of 89.03 for the fixed subsidy policy. For the coupled subsidy, the observed
price of seed is also statistically greater than the predicted value. Thus, the observed
price of seed is greater than theoretical prediction of 1.66 tokens. Additionally, in
accordance to theory’s prediction, the mean price of seed given the coupled subsidy is
statistically greater than the mean price without the coupled subsidy, and I conclude that
on average the coupled input subsidy will increase the price of seed, all else constant. It
is, however, interesting to note that the coupled subsidy on average increased the profits
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(i.e. increased the difference over the no-subsidy case) for the seed firm more so than for
the landowner. From the pricing results of the seed supplier, it makes since that I was
able to conclude that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically less than 138.02, the
theoretical prediction in the presence of the coupled subsidy, but it s greater than mean
profit of the seed firm in the presence of no subsidy.
In the no subsidy case, the observed price of land and seed were both was greater
than the predicted value; thus, it follows that the t-test for the farmers’ profit in the nosubsidy treatment indicates that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically less than
the theoretical prediction. However, the treatment effect across the no subsidy treatment
and fixed subsidy treatment are in accordance to theory’s predictions since the mean
profit of the farmer in the fixed subsidy is greater than the mean profit of the farmer in
the no-subsidy case. Intuitively, it follows that the mean profit of the farmer is
statistically less than the theoretical prediction for the fixed subsidy policy. For the
coupled subsidy, the observed input prices are greater than the predicted values; thus, the
observed profit of the farmer is less than the theoretical prediction of 70.69 tokens.
Additionally, in accordance to theory’s prediction, the mean profit of the famer given the
coupled subsidy is statistically greater than the mean profit without the coupled subsidy,
and I conclude that on average the coupled input subsidy will increase the profits of the
entire sector, all else constant.
Implications For Public Policy
The robust theoretical and experimental results indicate market power as having
adverse distributional impacts, thus, the market power granted to biotech firms (i.e.
Monsanto and those alike) through US patents needs to be of high concern when it comes
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to drafting future public policy. The distributional impacts from market power
exponentially intensify in the presence of a coupled subsidy, due to the multiplier effect.
Furthermore, as seen in the experimental results, the market power granted by these
patents has an added adverse impact on the entire sector when the input supplier(s)
engage in extremely high pricing strategies (i.e. set prices above their optimal price).
In addressing upstream market power established through US patents, I am able to
identify government failure not addressed in previous subsidy literature. The additional
government failure is due to the conflicting goals of the US Farm and US Patent policies.
In particular, there exist unintended consequences of the US Patent laws in the presence
of farm subsidies. These conflicting goals induce a large subsidy incidence. As such, the
positive externality created by the conflicting policies allows large upstream agribusiness
firms with patents, to benefit substantially by receiving the greatest percentage increase
in profits. More, concerning is the input suppliers’ percentage increase in profits are
almost double that of the farmer’s. This effect is exasperated when the farmer gains
countervailing market power in one of the input markets (i.e. land rental market).
Limitations And Suggestions For Further Research
Up until this point I have only discussed two potential outcomes of a bilateral
monopoly between the landowner and farmer. I have outlined the two extreme cases of
the dominate seller (landowner), and a dominate buyer (farmer). However, as mentioned
earlier, there exist a third possibility, the farmer and the landowner may negotiate noncooperatively or cooperate and achieve a multilateral beneficial outcome. Nevertheless,
the prices, quantities, and profits achieved in the two extreme cases, monopoly and
150

monopsony, provided useful baselines for analyzing bilateral negotiations between a
farmer and landowner.
Non- cooperative negotiation will allow the farmer to gain countervailing market
power. Countervailing market power defined and developed by John Kenneth Galbraith,
summarized by him is,
“… economic power has been mitigated –the gap filled–by countervailing power.
Those who are subject to the aggressions of economic power—to a monopoly
…have both a negative and a positive incentive to organize resistance...they are
encouraged to do so by the prospect of splitting off some of the gains associated
with the original power position. …bargaining power… a principal reliance of
the weak seller or the weak buyer when faced with a strong position across the
market”.
Where in the non-cooperative negotiation scenario, the equilibrium upper limit on
price (1.33) comes from the dominate seller case, and the dominate buyer case, provides
the lower limit on the rental rate of land (0). This implies that the landowner (farmer and
seed firm) can do no worse than the dominate buyer (seller) scenario and no better than
the dominate seller (buyer) scenario. I predict that the Nash bargaining outcomes on
average would decrease the price of land, but to what degree depends upon the
distribution of the market power in the land rental market. All else constant, this would
result in increased profits for the farmer and seed firm, and depending upon the reduction
in price, it could increase or decrease the profits for the landowner. Interestingly,
because it is the case that the land market affects the strategic behavior and profits of the
seed firm, as seen in the dominate buyer case, if the seed supplier accounts for the
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countervailing market power, his optimal strategy would be to increase the price of seed.
Thus, the seed firm is likely to receive the greatest benefits of this distribution of power
in the land market.
However, the ‘best outcome’ referred to as the cooperative solution would come
only from vertical integration or collusion between farmer and landowner, such that
vertical integration is the case when the farmer buys the land. Or, when participants both
parties acknowledge their common interdependence, they can collude to reach the most
efficient outcome
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USING THE CES PRODUCTION FUNCTION TO REPRESENT THE FARMER’S
TECHNOLOGY FUNCTION)
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The research initially attempted to utilize the fully flexible and the well-known
CES production function (Arrow et al, date). 13 Because two necessary inputs (land and
seed) where to be modeled, it was evident that the Elasticity of substitution, in addition
to the factor share and the factor supply, would be a key determinant in concern to
capitalization of the marginal subsidy dollar. Accordingly, the Constant Elastically of
Substitution (CES) production function was attempted which is frequently used to
estimate the elasticity of substitution between factors. However, recognition was made
regarding the following limitations of the CES Function.
i.

Restricts the elasticity of substitution to be same for any point along the
isoquant and across all factors.

ii.

Inability or limited ability to for serious research when more than two
inputs are involved.14

However, this functional form exhibits fundamental theoretical errors and
limitations in the presence of Bertrand market power. Primarily, regardless of product
differentiation, Bertrand competition results in input suppliers employing marginal cost
pricing.
Derivation of CES Theoretical Model
I start with the assumption of a CES production function and use a multi-stage
profit maximization approach to determine the Nash equilibriums. I will first derive the
input demand ( second stage reaction functions of the famer) for both factors of

In their work entitled “Capitalization Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency
This is one of the reason only 2 factors of productions are used with the thesis. Because to comply with
the CES function, representative factors of production land and seed explored. Nothing that the seed firm
is a proxy for any large agribusiness firm that has the ability to set prices. .
13
14
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production. I will follow by showing that the CES function ‘crashes (i.e. prices
competition results in the input firms pricing at marginal cost)’ when solving for the
Bertrand Nash equilibrium.
The famer’s objective function is represented as

MAX  F  P[ L    S  p ] v /   wL L  wS S ,
L,S

(71)

and was simplified by the following assumptions. A the efficiency parameter that
will be set equal to 1, for simplification.  and  are the share parameters, or the factor
intensity for input of land (L) and the commodity seed (S), respectively, where

    1 and    1 . To insure decreasing returns to scale15 0  v  1, where v is the
degree of homogeneity. Parameter  is directly related to the elasticity of substitution,
as:  

1
1
and  
1 


16

. The low degree of substitutability between the factors of

production is based on inelastic demand for seed and land (Saitone, Sexton and Sexton,
2008). Thus it is rational to assume, thus  will lie between 0 and 1 (Debertin, 1986).
To impose this restriction on the production function   0 and p  v  1, this will denote
the complementary technical interdependence of the two inputs.
Taking the First order necessary conditions with respect to the farmer’s choice
variables, quantity of land (L) and seed (S) we obtain:

This is assumed, and is an important parameter restrictions that insures value of the marginal products is
downward sloping.
16
when rho is infinite the elasticity of sub. approaches that of a Leontief and a as rho approaches 0 perfect
substitutes.
15
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The two first order conditions are simultaneously solved for L and S in terms of
prices. Solving for the expansion path yields,
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Solving, results in the derived factor demands for land and seed,
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and
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 w 
S*   S 
 v P 

(76)

Moving to stage two, where the seed manufacture and the landowner should be
able to force the famer to accept a set price. The seed manufactures (landowners) profit
maximization problem is specified total revenue minus total cost. The equations are
presented respectively.
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and

where C(S) and C(L) are the long run total cost functions and are assumed to be operating
at constant marginal cost. Thus, the cost represents the exogenous cost to the
representative seed manufacture and landowner and assumes all cost to be fixed thus
marginal cost is zero. Assuming the seed manufacture seeks to maximize profit, the first
order conditions, with respect to own price, for a maximum are given as:
g
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The landowner is also assumed to maximize profit, thus the first order conditions
for a maximum with respect to own price is specified as:
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According to the first order condition for a maximum, the firms will equate
marginal revenue to marginal cost. Thus, the FOC can be re-written as:
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Solving the behavioral rule for own price yields,
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Through the use of Bertrand Model I attempted to examine the interdependence
between rivals' decisions in terms of pricing decisions. However, this is where the
problem arose, as solving for the Bertrand prices.
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Thus, the Bertrand solution is that of a perfectly competitive market (i.e. input
price = marginal cost). First, this is not consistent with price setting firms and secondly
this model specifies a situation in which neither the landowner nor seed manufacture
would be able to extract rent, more specifically the marginal subsidy dollar. This relation
is depicted in Figure A1, in which we can see that when the firms exist symmetric
marginal cost, which are set to 0, prices will also be set to 0. Thus, the seed neither
manufacture nor land experience long run profit.
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Thus, I am not able to use the CES production function in Bertrand competition,
price-setting firms. And I therefore propose and move forward with the quadratic and
strictly concave utility function developed by Bowley (1924), which is adapted as a
production function
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AND IRB APPLICATION DOCUMENTS
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Treatment 1 Instructions
**Instructions for Market Experiment 1**
Thank you for coming!!!
Experiment Basics
YOUR ROLE
Today, you will be participating in a series of experiments regarding i) your decision
making in a market setting, ii) the decisions you make in risky situations, and iii) your
level of assertive behavior in various scenarios.
In the first experiment, you will either be making price decisions as sellers that impact all
participants earnings, or you be will be subject to the pricing decisions of sellers, hence
the buyer.
In the second experiment you will be making independent choices where the outcome of
your decision is not certain

EARNINGS
You have been paid a $5.00 showing-up fee. This money is yours regardless of whether
you complete the experiment today.
Experiment 1: You earn tokens based upon the decisions you make and those made by
others. At the end of the experiment today, the number of tokens you earn will be
converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.
Experiment 2: Your earnings depend only upon the choices you make and a series of
random draws. Your possible earnings are in dollar increments.
Your total earnings for the experiment today are the summation of your earnings from
Experiments 1, 2, and the $5.00 show-up fee.
The entire experimental session is expected to last for approximately 90 minutes.

Before each experiment, I will read the instructions aloud. After reading the instructions,
I will take time to answer individual questions.
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Market Experiment










In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).
There will be 6 Sellers of product A, 6 Sellers of product B, and 6 Buyers (C) of
products A and B in the room today.
The determination of whether you are an A or B product Seller or a product Buyer
(C) is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment.
You will remain an A or B product Seller or a product Buyer (C) throughout the
experimental session today.
Your payoffs in the experiment today are determined by:
1) The price chosen by Seller A for product A, and
2) The price chosen by Seller B for product B,
The experimental session consist of 20 trading rounds.
For each trading round, you will be randomly matched with a different set of
trading partners/rivals.
There are no wrong or right decisions, only decisions you feel are in your best
interest.

Stages of Each Trading Period
Each trading period consists of two stages. These stages (i.e. steps) are the same for
every trading period.
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions
 Seller A chooses a price for product A.
→ The price of product A must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).
→ Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price while making pricing decisions.
 Seller B chooses a price for product B.
→ The price of product B must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).
→ Seller B does not observe Seller A’s price while making pricing decisions.


Please refer to Table 1. When making your pricing decisions, please note that:
1) Seller A’s prices are located down the left hand side of the table.
2) Seller B’s prices are located across the top of the table.
3) Table 1 includes only some of the possible prices and payoffs and thus
serves as a rough guideline for making pricing decisions. Remember,
you are free to choose any price between 0 and 1.99 tokens.
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Stage 2: Payoffs Received by Seller A, Seller B and Buyer C

Please again refer to Table 1.


The payoffs, Sellers A and B as well as, Buyer C receive for each trading period
is determined by the trade prices of products A and B.



Notice in Table 1 that for any given price combination, within each cell, the
amount of tokens Seller A receives is the top left number, the amount of tokens
Seller B receives is the top right number and the tokens Buyer C would earn is
the bottom middle number.

Example Trading Rounds
1) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.06 tokens and Seller B chooses a
price of 1.60 tokens. Using Table 1, locate product A’s row price on the
left side of the table. Then, move across to the column that corresponds to
product B’s price. As you can see, Seller A receives a payoff of 71.16
tokens, Seller B receives a payoff of 106.98 tokens and Buyer C would
earn a payoff of 44.93 tokens.
2) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.86 tokens and Seller B chooses a
price of 0.80 tokens. Using Table 1, locate product A’s row on the left
side of the table. Then, move across to the column that corresponds to
product B’s price. As you can see, Seller A receives a payoff of 124.12
tokens, Seller B receives a payoff of 53.81 tokens and Buyer C would earn
a payoff of 45.03 tokens.
3) However, suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.37 tokens and Seller B
chooses a price of 1.04 tokens. Notice that neither of these prices appears
on Table 1. However, a close approximation would be locating the cell at
the row/column intersection for A’s price of 1.33 tokens and B’s price of
1.06 tokens.

Are there any questions about how you can use Table 1 to determine your
earnings given the price choices of Sellers A and B?
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Computer Interaction
Stage 1: Price Decisions




Each Seller will view the following screen on their computer when making
pricing decisions

Price choices of Seller A and Seller B
1) Sellers A and B enter their price in the box located in the middle of the
computer screen. Note: the computer will not accept a price less than 0 or
a price greater than 1.99.
2) Once Sellers are confident with their pricing decisions, they must submit
their choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the lower right hand corner
of the computer screen.



While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer will be presented
with a blank waiting screen. However, once both Sellers have input their pricing
decisions, Buyer C will ‘click’ the red OK button, and the experiment will continue
to stage 2.
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Stage 2: Trading Round Summary


All participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) will view the
following summary screen on their computer.



The trading round’s summary consists of the prices chosen by both Sellers (A and
B) and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller A, Seller B, and Buyer
C). Note: You will not see the summary of results for other randomly matched
participants.



Your payoffs are denoted as “Your Profit” on the summary screen.



In addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of your payoffs are displayed
at the bottom of the screen.



The summary will appear on each participant’s screen for 30 seconds.



After 30 seconds, you will automatically move on to the next trading round.

Are there any questions about how to interact with the computer?
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Let’s Practice.

We will start with 3 practice trading rounds. These practice rounds will not be applied
towards your earnings for the day.

Practice rounds are denoted as -2, -1 and 0. Once
everyone has finished the practice rounds, you will
automatically move forward with round 1.

If you have any questions at any time, please notify the
experimenters by raising your hand.

There is to be no communication between participants or looking on other’s
computer screens. If anyone is caught doing so, the session will end, participants
will be excused and paid their current experiment earnings.
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Figure 55

Payoff Table for Treatment 1
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Treatment 2 Instructions
**Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 2)**
Thank you for coming!!!
Experiment Basics
YOUR ROLE
Today, you will be participating in a series of experiments regarding i) your decision
making in a market setting, ii) the decisions you make in risky situations, and iii) your
level of assertive behavior in various scenarios.
In the first experiment, you will either be making price decisions as sellers that impact all
participants earnings, or you be will be subject to the pricing decisions of sellers, hence
the buyer.
In the second experiment you will be making independent choices where the outcome of
your decision is not certain.
EARNINGS
You have been paid a $5.00 showing-up fee. This money is yours regardless of whether
you complete the experiment today.
Experiment 1: You earn tokens based upon the decisions you make and those made by
others. At the end of the experiment today, the number of tokens you earn will be
converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.
Experiment 2: Your earnings depend only upon the choices you make and a series of
random draws. Your possible earnings are in dollar increments.
Your total earnings for the experiment today are the summation of your earnings from
Experiments 1, 2, and the $5.00 show-up fee.
The entire experimental session is expected to last for approximately 90 minutes.
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Before each experiment, I will read the instructions aloud. After reading the instructions,
I will take time to answer individual questions.
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Market Experiment










In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).
There will be 6 Sellers of product A, 6 Sellers of product B and 6 Buyers (C) of
both products A and B in the room today.
The determination of whether you are an A or B product Seller or a Buyer (C) is
randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment.
You will remain an A or B Seller or Buyer (C) throughout the entire experiment.
Your payoffs in the market experiment are determined by:
1) The price chosen by Seller A for product A,
2) The price chosen by Seller B for product B.
The experimental session consist of 20 trading rounds.
For each trading round, you will be randomly matched with a different set of
trading partners/rivals.
There are not wrong or right decisions, only decisions you feel are in your best
interest.

Stages of Each Trading Period
Each trading round consists of two stages. These stages are the same for every trading
round.
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions


Seller A chooses a price for product A.
→ The price of product A must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).
→ Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price decision while making their
own pricing decision.



Seller B chooses a price for product B.
→ The price of product B must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).
→ Seller B does not observe Seller B’s price decision while making their
own pricing decision.



Please refer to Table 3. When making your pricing decisions, please note that:
1) Seller A’s prices are located down the left hand side of the table.
2) Seller B’s prices are located across the top of the table.
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3) Table 3 includes only some of the possible prices and payoffs and thus
serves only as a rough guideline for making pricing decisions.
Remember, you are free to choose any price between 0 and 1.99
tokens in one hundredth increments.
Stage 2: Earnings (Payoffs) Received by Seller A, Seller B and Buyer C


Please again refer to Table 3.



The payoffs that Sellers A and B, as well as, Buyer C receive for each trading
round is determined by the trade prices chosen by the Sellers for their respective
products.



Notice that in Table 3, for any given price combination, within each cell the
amount of tokens Seller A would earn is the top left number, the amount of
tokens Seller B would earn is the top right number and the tokens Buyer C would
earn is the bottom number.

Example Trading Rounds
1) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.06 tokens and Seller B chooses a
price of 1.60 tokens. Using Table 3, locate A’s row price on the left side
of the table. Then, move across to the column that corresponds to B’s
price. As you can see, Seller A would earn a payoff of 71.16 tokens,
Seller B would earn a payoff of 106.98 tokens and Buyer C would earn a
payoff of 128.93 tokens.
2) Now suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.86 tokens and Seller B chooses
a price of 0.80 tokens. Using Table 3, locate A’s row price on the left side
of the table. Then, move across to the column that corresponds to B’s
price. As you can see, Seller A would instead earn a payoff of 124.12
tokens, Seller B would instead earn a payoff of 53.81 tokens and Buyer C
would instead earn a payoff of 129.03 tokens.
3) However, suppose Seller A would like to choose a price of 1.37 tokens
and Seller B a price of 1.04 tokens. Notice that neither of these prices
appears on Table 3. However, a close approximation of earnings can be
located in the payoff cell at the row/column intersection of A’s price of
1.33 and B’s price of 1.06.

Are there any questions about how you can use Table 3 to determine your
earnings given the price choices of Sellers A and B?
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Computer Interaction
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions
 Each Seller will view the following screen on their computer when making pricing
decisions.



Price choices of Seller A and Seller B
1) Sellers A and B enter their price in the box located in the middle of the
computer screen. Note: the computer will not accept a price less than 0 or a
price greater than 1.99.

2) Once Sellers are confident with their pricing decisions, they must submit their
choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the lower right hand corner of the
computer screen.
While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer will be presented with a blank
waiting screen. However, once both Sellers have input their pricing decisions, Buyer C will
‘click’ the red OK button, and the experiment will continue to stage 2.
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Stage 2: Trading Round Summary


All participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) will view the following
summary screen on their computer.



The trading round’s summary consists of the prices chosen by both Sellers (A and B)
and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller A, Seller B, and Buyer C).
Note: You will not see the summary of results for other randomly matched
participants.



Your payoffs are denoted as “Your Profit” on the summary screen.



In addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of your payoffs are displayed at
the bottom of the screen.



The summary will appear on each participant’s screen for 30 seconds.



After 30 seconds, you will automatically move on to the next trading round.

Are there any questions about how to interact with the computer?
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Let’s Practice.

We will start with 3 practice trading rounds. These practice rounds will not be applied
towards your earnings for the day.

Practice rounds are denoted as -2, -1 and 0. Once
everyone has finished the practice rounds, you will
automatically move forward with round 1.

If you have any questions at any time, please notify the
experimenters by raising your hand.

There is to be no communication between participants or looking on other’s
computer screens. If anyone is caught doing so, the session will end, participants
will be excused and paid their current experiment earnings.
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Figure 56

Payoff Table Treatment 2
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Treatment 3 Instructions
** Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 5)**
Thank you for coming!!!
Experiment Basics
YOUR ROLE
Today, you will be participating in a series of experiments regarding i) your decision
making in a market setting, ii) the decisions you make in risky situations, and iii) your
level of assertive behavior in various scenarios.
In the first experiment, you will either be making price decisions as sellers that impact all
participants earnings, or you be will be subject to the pricing decisions of sellers, hence
the buyer.
In the second experiment you will be making independent choices where the outcome of
your decision is not certain.
EARNINGS
You have been paid a $5.00 showing-up fee. This money is yours regardless of whether
you complete the experiment today.
Experiment 1: You earn tokens based upon the decisions you make and those made by
others. At the end of the experiment today, the number of tokens you earn will be
converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.
Experiment 2: Your earnings depend only upon the choices you make and a series of
random draws. Your possible earnings are in dollar increments.
Your total earnings for the experiment today are the summation of your earnings from
Experiments 1, 2, and the $5.00 show-up fee.
The entire experimental session is expected to last for approximately 90 minutes.

Before each experiment, I will read the instructions aloud. After reading the instructions,
I will take time to answer individual questions
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Market Experiment










In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).
There will be 6 Sellers of product A, 6 Sellers of product B and 6 Buyers (C) of
both products A and B in the room today.
The determination of whether you are an A or B product Seller or a Buyer (C) is
randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment.
You will remain an A or B Seller or Buyer (C) throughout the entire experiment.
Your payoffs in the market experiment are determined by:
1) The price chosen by Seller A for product A,
2) The price chosen by Seller B for product B.
The experimental session consist of 20 trading rounds.
For each trading round, you will be randomly matched with a different set of
trading partners/rivals.
There are no wrong or right decisions, only decisions you feel are in your best
interest.

Stages of Each Trading Period
Each trading period consists of two stages. These stages (i.e. steps) are the same for
every trading round.
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions
 Seller A chooses a price for product A.
→ The price of product A must be between 0 and 2.51 tokens, in one
hundredth increments (1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).
→ Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price while making their own pricing
decisions.
 Seller B chooses a price for product B.
→ The price of product B must be between 0 and 2.51 tokens, in one
hundredth increments (1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).
→ Seller B does not observe Seller A’s price while making their own pricing
decisions.


Please refer to Table 5. When making your pricing decisions, please note that:
1) Seller A’s prices are located down the left hand side of the table.
2) Seller B’s prices are located across the top of the table.
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3) Table 5 includes only some of the possible prices and payoffs and thus
serves as a rough guideline for making pricing decisions. Remember,
you are free to choose any price between 0 and 2.51 tokens.
Stage 2: Earnings (Payoffs) Received by Seller A, Seller B and Buyer C

Please again refer to Table 5.




The payoffs that Sellers A and B, as well as, Buyer C receive for each trading
round is determined by the trade prices chosen by the Sellers for their respective
products.
Notice that in Table 5, for any given price combination, within each cell the
amount of tokens Seller A would earn is the top left number, the amount of
tokens Seller B would earn is the top right number and the tokens Buyer C would
earn is the bottom number.

Example Trading Rounds
1) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.40 tokens and Seller B chooses a
price of 1.66 tokens. Using Table 5, locate product A’s row price on the
left side of the table. Then, move across to the column that corresponds to
product B’s price. As you can see, Seller A would earn a payoff of 136.75
tokens, Seller B would earn a payoff of 160.49 tokens and Buyer C would
earn a payoff of 94.29 tokens.
2) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.94 tokens and Seller B chooses a
price of 1.40 tokens. Using Table 5, locate product A’s row on the left
side of the table. Then, move across to the column that corresponds to
product B’s price. As you can see, Seller A would earn a payoff of 161.24
tokens, Seller B would earn a payoff of 116.04 tokens and Buyer C
receives a payoff of 68.92 tokens.
3) However, suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.30 tokens and Seller B
chooses a price of 1.37 tokens. Neither of these prices appears on Table 5.
However, a close approximation would be locating the cell at the
row/column intersection of A’s price of 1.25 and B’s price of 1.40.

Are there any questions about how you can use Table 5 to determine your
earnings given the price choices of Sellers A and B?
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Computer Interaction
Stage 1: Price Decisions
 Each Seller will view the following screen on their computer when making
pricing decisions



Price choices of Seller A and Seller B
1) Sellers A and B enter their price in the box located in the middle of the
computer screen. Note: the computer will not accept a price less than 0 or
a price greater than 2.51.
2) Once Sellers are confident with their pricing decisions, they must submit
their choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the lower right hand corner
of the computer screen.
While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer will be presented
with a blank waiting screen. However, once both Sellers have input their pricing
decisions, Buyer C will ‘click’ the red OK button, and the experiment will continue
to stage 2.
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Stage 2: Trading Round Summary


All participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) will view the
following summary screen on their computer.



The trading round’s summary consists of the prices chosen by both Sellers (A and
B) and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller A, Seller B, and Buyer
C). Note: You will not see the summary of results for other randomly matched
participants.



Your payoffs are denoted as “Your Profit” on the summary screen.



In addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of your payoffs are displayed
at the bottom of the screen.



The summary will appear on each participant’s screen for 30 seconds.



After 30 seconds, you will automatically move on to the next trading round.

Are there any questions about how to interact with the computer?
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Let’s Practice.

We will start with 3 practice trading rounds. These practice rounds will not be applied
towards your earnings for the day.

Practice rounds are denoted as -2, -1 and 0. Once
everyone has finished the practice rounds, you will
automatically move forward with round 1.

If you have any questions at any time, please notify the
experimenters by raising your hand.

There is to be no communication between participants or looking on other’s
computer screens. If anyone is caught doing so, the session will end, participants
will be excused and paid their current experiment earnings.
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Figure 57

Payoff Table Treatment 3
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